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LITIGATING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
Elizabeth Earle Beske∗
INTRODUCTION
In marked contrast to its predecessor, the Roberts Court has carved a clear
and confident role for itself in adjudicating separation-of-powers disputes.
Examining the Constitution’s text, structure, and history to determine the
respective authority of Congress and the Executive, the Roberts Court has
proclaimed, is “what courts do.”1 And yet, to field these cases, the Court has
often been constrained by Rehnquist-era precedent to prefer individual private
litigants over institutional actors,2 even when doing so is difficult to square with
the niceties of Article III and even when reliance on individual litigants means
some separation-of-powers problems may never be resolved. Obvious
stakeholders, the institutional actors, have faced a tough-to-impossible climb in
bringing disputes before the courts, and the Supreme Court’s preference for
individual claimants has required it to engage in some crafty, if occasionally
dubious, moves to ensure a steady diet of claims.3 This Article examines the
Court’s reliance on individual litigants to raise separation-of-powers claims and
finds significant problems, both doctrinal and practical. It proceeds to
reexamine the Court’s treatment of institutional standing and argues that there
is both room to maneuver around the more concerning limitations of Raines v.
Byrd,4 the decades-old case that effectively shut down congressional, and, by
implication, most institutional standing, and—more importantly—strong
reason to do so in the limited circumstances where institutional actors lack the
ability to self-help.5 There are both doctrinal and prudential reasons to be
skeptical of wide-ranging institutional standing; however, there are identifiable

∗ Associate Professor, American University Washington College of Law. I am deeply indebted to
Henry Monaghan and wish also to thank Kent Barnett, John Q. Barrett, David Eggert, Tara Leigh Grove,
Peggy McGuinness, Caleb Nelson, James Pfander, and Seth Barrett Tillman for their helpful comments on
earlier versions of this draft. Katie Thomas provided invaluable research assistance.
1. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I), 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012). Professors Laurence
Tribe and Joshua Matz described the case as a “vivid defense of the role courts play in proclaiming the law”
and a “ringing proclamation of judicial power to state the law.” LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ,
UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 299–300 (2014).
2. This article will contrast “individual litigants,” who are generally private individuals, with
“institutional litigants,” who are actors situated within one of the three coordinate branches of government.
3. See infra Part II.
4. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
5. David Pozen first brought the term “self-help” into the separation-of-powers sphere. David E.
Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 7–8 (2014). He defined it as “any attempt to
resolve another branch’s wrongdoing in lieu of or prior to third-party dispute resolution.” Id. at 12; see also id.
at 22 (focusing definition on forms of self-help “that begin, and often end, outside the courts”).
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circumstances where it is necessary, and placing the mantle primarily on
individual litigants limits the role of real parties in interest, results in scattershot
rulings, and rests uneasily with conventional notions of judicial power.
The increasingly formalist6 Roberts Court has been a frequent and
comparatively enthusiastic participant in the separation-of-powers sphere.
Consistent with its confidence playing the role announced in Zivotofsky ex rel.
Zivotofsky v. Clinton (Zivotofsky I),7 the Roberts Court has repeatedly fielded cases
in which litigants have claimed congressional incursions on the domain of
Article III courts,8 examined the President’s authority to make recess
appointments and thereby elide the Senate confirmation process,9 and jumped
in to defend the prerogatives of the executive vis-à-vis Congress, particularly in
the Appointments Clause context.10 In Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,11 the Court
refereed a clash between Congress and the President over subpoenas for the
President’s financial documents, reaching the merits and setting ground rules
despite noting that coordinate branches had “managed for over two centuries
to resolve such disputes among themselves without the benefit of guidance
from us.”12
In fielding separation-of-powers claims, the Court has preferred individual
litigants to institutional plaintiffs, even where individual interests and stakes are
remote or derivative.13 In Lucia v. Securities & Exchange Commission,14 a litigant
subject to an SEC enforcement proceeding challenged the appointment of his
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), claiming that SEC ALJs are “officers” who
must be appointed by “Heads of Departments.”15 After determining that the
ALJs were in fact “officers,” the Court turned to the question of remedy.16
Recognizing that the ALJ before whom Lucia had his hearing could fairly
6. See Harlan Grant Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts Court, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 380, 420–21 (2015) (describing a decisive shift to formalism under the Roberts Court as a
manifestation of distrust of other branches); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New
Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of
State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1615 (2012) (observing that the Roberts
Court has “eschewed functionalist reasoning in favor of formalist analysis of separation-of-powers
questions”).
7. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
8. See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 903 (2018); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578 U.S. 212, 235–36
(2016); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 677–79 (2015); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462,
482–84 (2011); see infra notes 245–248 and accompanying text.
9. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 537–38 (2013); see infra note 254 and accompanying text.
10. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561
U.S. 477 (2010); see infra notes 255–259 and accompanying text.
11. 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
12. Id. at 2031.
13. See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 222 (2011) (“In the precedents of this Court, the
claims of individuals—not of Government departments—have been the principal source of judicial decisions
concerning separation of powers and checks and balances.”).
14. 138 S. Ct. at 2044.
15. Id. at 2047.
16. Id. at 2055.
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readily obtain a constitutional appointment from the SEC and would likely issue
the same decision on rehearing,17 the Court required that Lucia have a new
hearing before a different ALJ in order to “create ‘[]incentive[s] to raise
Appointments Clause challenges.’”18 Without the prospect of such a bounty,
the Court assumed the individual would have insufficient skin in the game and
no reason to advance the legal claim.19 Lucia’s stark suggestion that individual
plaintiffs are not, in fact, advancing their own interests in these cases rests
uncomfortably with the conventional understanding of injury-in-fact.20 In this
area, the Court has relied without statutory authority on judicially-incentivized,
de facto private attorneys general, and that, too, is in tension with the Court’s
precedents.21
The Roberts Court found itself in this conceptual jam because its
predecessor, the Rehnquist Court, had shut down most litigation avenues for
the institutional actors whose interests lurked in the background. After a
majority of the Burger Court failed to coalesce around the political question
doctrine to dodge a dispute between President Carter and several Senators in
Goldwater v. Carter,22 Chief Justice Rehnquist switched tactics in Raines v. Byrd,23
which adopted a constricted view of congressional standing and enshrined
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s shut-it-down mood.24 Raines cast doubt upon any
separation-of-powers suits by members of Congress without express
authorization from the entire chamber and left intact only a sliver of suits
asserting institutional injury when members’ voting power is “held for
naught.”25 Rejecting the claim in Raines could have been easy—individual
legislators had challenged a statute enacted over their objection and thus sought
to import a political tussle straight from the halls of Congress into the judicial
arena.26 The complained-of incursion on congressional authority in Raines, in

17. During the pendency of the case, the SEC issued an order that “ratified its prior appointment” of
the ALJs. See Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Ratifies Appointment of
Administrative Law Judges (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-215. Lucia
challenged the validity of that ratification, but the Court found no reason to address it because the SEC had
not indicated that Lucia’s rehearing would be before an ALJ whose appointment depended on it. Lucia, 138
S. Ct. at 2055 n.6.
18. Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2055 n.5 (alteration in original) (quoting Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177,
183 (1995)).
19. See id.
20. See Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court, 128 HARV. L. REV. 124, 141 (2014)
(describing the Court’s tacit recognition “that we should regard as fiction” the notion that an Appointments
Clause case “was about the rights of any particular litigant”).
21. See infra notes 300–317 and accompanying text.
22. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
23. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
24. See id. at 823–24.
25. Id. at 823 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 823–24, 829–30; Greene, supra note 20, at 139 (observing
that the Court has permitted congressional standing “only in the narrow circumstances of an injury to a
member’s personal rather than institutional interests”).
26. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
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other words, was a congressional creation. In its haste to reject the challenge,
the Court wrote an opinion far broader than circumstance required and failed
to distinguish amongst different kinds of congressional claims and injuries. In
so doing, the Court left Congress almost completely incapable of appealing to
the judiciary when its problem is not with its own handiwork but with the
actions of another branch.
The executive branch has more self-help options in the event of
congressional encroachment, so its role going to court as a turf-defending
plaintiff in its own right has not been conclusively established.27 If the executive
finds that an act of Congress invades its constitutional prerogatives, the
President usually can either veto or, more controversially, refuse to enforce it.28
But, if the act of Congress is self-executing, like an administrative scheme that
trenches on the executive’s appointment authority, the executive branch has no
such ability to self-help. Individual litigants subject to coercive action—
particularly if duly incentivized as in Lucia—can serve to vindicate the
executive’s authority in many cases. The protection offered by individual
litigants, though, is spotty; they can rarely serve as an alternative prospect in the
absence of coercive action, leaving some separation-of-powers claims without
adequate redress.29
One never writes on a blank slate in the justiciability area, and this particular
“fragment” has generated significant recent debate, with scholars all over the
map in their approaches and arguments.30 Preferring vindication by institutional
actors, Professor Aziz Huq has argued that individual plaintiffs should not have
standing to “enforce a structural constitutional principle redounding to the
benefit of an official institution, [when] there is no reason the latter could not
enforce that interest itself.”31 He expressly reserved the question whether the
Court’s precedents have in fact permitted institutional plaintiffs to sue,32 and
this Article both takes that up and finds that the current understanding of case
law in fact gives institutional actors too little recourse. Likewise favoring a role
for institutional plaintiffs, Professor Jamal Greene has advocated a statute or
constitutional amendment conferring power on the Court, at the behest of
27. See Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311, 1326 (2014) (“The
Supreme Court has never held that the executive has standing to assert an institutional interest in the
enforcement of federal law or, relatedly, in protecting any other duties or powers conferred by Article II.”).
28. See id. at 1327; see also Pozen, supra note 5, at 22–23 (noting that most scholars believe the
President’s refusal to enforce an act she has not determined to be unconstitutional would violate the Take
Care Clause).
29. Consider, for example, the various efforts to challenge the allegedly unconstitutional composition
of the Federal Open Market Committee, a key policy arm of the Federal Reserve System. See infra notes 326–
333 and accompanying text.
30. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2015)
(observing that “[r]ecent years have witnessed the accelerated fragmentation of standing into a multitude of
varied, complexly related subdoctrines”).
31. Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1514 (2013).
32. Id. at 1440 n.16.
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institutional actors, to adjudicate separation-of-powers disputes where the
Constitution lays out a rule.33 He has argued that “[d]ispute over the meaning
of constitutional rules is . . . precisely the context that least rewards patience in
awaiting a plaintiff who has suffered individualized harm.”34 This Article agrees
with Greene’s instincts and finds a reading of Raines and its progeny that permits
some suits by institutional actors to enforce constitutional rules under existing
law. Taking an opposing approach, Professor Kent Barnett has contended that
individual regulated parties should have standing to raise separation-of-powers
claims, which he likens to “procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes
or ignores its otherwise mandatory desiderata.”35 He has argued that individual
actors are superior to the political branches, which often face partisan and
policy-based distractions and impediments to suit.36 This Article parts company
with Barnett on standing (in places) and demonstrates that there are some cases
individual actors cannot reliably bring. Professor Tara Leigh Grove has argued
that the enumerated powers granted to Congress and the executive in Articles
I and II, respectively, do not encompass the authority to bring suit to protect
their turf—thus precluding any institutional standing in this context—and that
courts in any event ought to be skeptical of government standing in order to
avoid enmeshing the judiciary in battles more suited to the political arena.37 This
Article finds room in the Constitution for turf protection and, though
appreciating Grove’s skepticism, contends that limited institutional standing is
necessary for safeguarding our constitutional structure, particularly in this
polarized “Age of Dysfunction.”38
Whether it is a good or bad idea for the federal judiciary to leap into the
fray and decide complicated separation-of-powers questions, the Roberts Court
has demonstrated enthusiasm for the jumps, carving out a niche for itself in
policing the boundaries of the three branches’ authority and opening its doors
to, and even inviting, structural challenge. Reliance on individuals to bring these
questions before the Court gives rise to considerable problems; the conceit of
this Article is that existing stumbling blocks to suits by institutional actors can
33. Greene, supra note 20, at 146, 152.
34. Id. at 146.
35. Kent Barnett, Standing for (and up to) Separation of Powers, 91 IND. L.J. 665, 694 (2016). As discussed
infra, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), may be read to cast doubt on the present viability of bare
procedural interests. See infra notes 86–100 and accompanying text.
36. See Barnett, supra note 35, at 685.
37. See Grove, supra note 27, at 1355–57 (arguing that neither Congress nor the executive has authority
to sue for institutional injuries); Tara Leigh Grove, Justice Scalia’s Other Standing Legacy, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
2243, 2264 (2017) (observing that a central purpose of standing is to “ensur[e] that the courts do not become
substitute forums for matters that should be left to the political process”). See generally Tara Leigh Grove,
Government Standing and the Fallacy of the Institutional Injury, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (2019) (arguing against the
concept of institutional injury at all and claiming that institutional actors lack any interest in their institutional
prerogatives).
38. Jonathan Zasloff coined this term, and it is perhaps even more apt now than when he described it
in 2012. See Jonathan Zasloff, Courts in the Age of Dysfunction, 121 YALE L.J.F. 479, 479 (2012).
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be, and in certain circumstances ought to be, overcome. Part I compares the
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts’ approaches to the justiciability of conflicts
between coordinate branches and demonstrates that, while the Rehnquist Court
shied away from such battles, the Roberts Court has reclaimed a more confident
role in determining boundaries in both garden-variety and more nuanced turf
disputes. Part II examines the Roberts Court’s reliance on individual claimants,
born of necessity after Rehnquist-era Raines sharply curtailed institutional
standing, and demonstrates that dependence on individual litigants instead of
institutional litigants to vindicate separation-of-powers principles is difficult to
square with principles of standing, relies on a questionable private attorney
general mechanism, and gives rise to gaps in the Court’s ability to play its selfappointed part. Finally, in light of the problems presented by exclusive reliance
on individual plaintiffs, Part III revisits the question of institutional litigants.
This Part finds room in existing case law for institutional standing where the
gravamen of the claim is that an outside actor is thwarting the exercise of
institutional prerogatives set out in the Constitution.
I. THE ROBERTS COURT’S COMPARATIVE CONFIDENCE IN ADJUDICATING
BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Two related justiciability concepts surround the question of which actors
are best-suited (if indeed any are well-suited) to bring separation-of-powers
questions into the federal courts, the political question doctrine and standing.
This Section briefly touches upon each before tracing how they have surfaced
in the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in the context of structural litigation. As I
will show, the Roberts Court has embraced a more expansive role for the federal
judiciary, despite the political question doctrine, without a corresponding
reassessment of standing concepts.
A. Diffuse Theoretical Underpinnings of the Political Question Doctrine
As is evident from its most recent outing in the political gerrymandering
cases,39 the political question doctrine often sharply divides both the Court and
its audience and is by no means in retreat. Chief Justice Marshall first staked out
the Court’s role in limiting the other branches to their enumerated powers in
Marbury v. Madison,40 distinguishing between actions that are susceptible of
judicial resolution and those that are not.41 Where executive actors proceed on
39. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). In Rucho, a deeply divided Court held that
the political question doctrine precluded judicial consideration of political gerrymandering cases because of
the absence of “legal standards to limit and direct their decisions.” Id. at 2507.
40. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41. See id. at 166–67; see also Elizabeth Earle Beske, Political Question Disconnects, 67 AM. U. L. REV. F.
35, 37 (2018) (finding antecedents of the political question doctrine in Marbury).
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matters properly within their discretion, “there exists, and can exist, no power
to control that discretion.”42 The judiciary lacks any role, and “nothing can be
more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable.”43
Conversely, where an institutional actor exceeds that discretion, an injured party
“has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.”44 Marshall saw it
as the judiciary’s province to determine whether an institutional actor was acting
intra vires or ultra vires and proceeded to do precisely that.45 Thus, in the course
of deciding Marbury’s right to the commission, the Court concluded both that
Congress had exceeded its authority in conferring additional original
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and that federal courts had authority to issue
writs of mandamus for executive actors who stepped out of bounds.46
While Marbury provided logical underpinnings for the classical political
question doctrine, competing conceptions emerged over time. Professors
Herbert Wechsler, a classicist, and Alexander Bickel, a prudentialist, famously
debated whether the political question doctrine ought to be invoked sparingly47
or employed whenever judges believed that expedience and, particularly,
concern for institutional legitimacy might require it.48 The Court laid out six
factors in Baker v. Carr49 to guide invocation of the doctrine that confusingly

42. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166. See also Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 499 (1866)
(barring judicial review of a “purely executive and political” presidential action).
43. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 176; see also Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV 237, 248–49 (2002) (noting that Marshall made
clear “that it was for the Court to determine whether an issue presented a political question, committed to
the discretion of the political branches, or a judicial question, which the Court could answer”).
46. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166, 177. Professor Monaghan has argued that Marbury entrenches a
private rights model of adjudication, delimiting constitutional boundaries only in the course of adjudicating
individual rights. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363,
1367 (1973). Certainly, cases like Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867), substantiate this insight. In
Stanton, the Court rejected the State of Georgia’s challenge to enforcement of the Reconstruction Acts,
deeming the questions “political” and noting pointedly that the case did not involve the infringement of
“private rights or private property.” Id. Professor Fallon finds support for a “special function” model in
Marbury as well, noting that Marbury’s conclusion that mandamus lies against federal officers was a gratuitous
pronouncement given the Court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. See Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Marbury and the Constitutional Mind: A Bicentennial Essay on the Wages of Doctrinal Tension, 91 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2003).
47. This is the Wechsler view. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1959).
48. This is the Bickelian counterargument. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV. L. REV. 40, 46 (1961).
49. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The six factors are (1) “a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;” (2) “a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it;” (3) “the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;” (4) “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;” (5)
“an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;” and (6) “the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.” Id.
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combined features of both views.50 At the same time, others questioned the
need for the doctrine at all. Professor Louis Henkin wrote an influential article
entitled, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?,51 in which he argued that
situations deemed “nonjusticiable” simply involved on-the-merits conclusions
that the institutional actor was acting within the boundaries of its discretion.52
Put differently, and in terms that might have resonated with Chief Justice
Marshall, the Court had adjudged that “[t]he act complained of violates no
constitutional limitation on that power, either because the Constitution imposes
no relevant limitations, or because the action is amply within the limits
prescribed.”53
Over the decades, the Court has vacillated in its embrace of its role as
referee. Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, and later, the Rehnquist Court writ
large, gravitated to a more prudentialist view that federal courts ought to have
a minimal role in navigating disputes among branches to avoid the unseemliness
of wading into an interbranch dispute, while the Roberts Court has reclaimed a
more first-principles view that federal courts have a constitutionally mandated
role to play in delineating the outer boundaries of coordinate branch authority.54
B. The Elusive Standing Algorithm
The other justiciability concept interposing obstacles to adjudication in the
separation-of-powers context, standing, makes the political question doctrine
look both simple and uncontroversial.55 While all lawyers can recite the simple
mantra that standing encompasses the three requirements of injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability, standing has justifiably been described by
observers as “incoherent,”56 a “mixture of complexity and lack of articulate

50. See Barkow, supra note 45, at 265 (classifying the first and perhaps the second factor as classical
and factors three through six as prudential). Scholars have sharply debated the nature and scope of the
political question doctrine. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1908, 1910 (2015); J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 99
(1988) (noting broad disagreement over whether the doctrine exists at all or whether it exists but should not).
51. Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
52. See id. at 601.
53. Id.
54. See infra Sections I.C.a, I.D.a.
55. See Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1195 (2014) (“[I]t is hard to find a scholarly
treatment of standing that does not remark on the doctrine’s apparent incoherence.”).
56. F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 275, 276 (2008);
see also Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 229 (1990) (noting that courts and
commentators “have failed to formulate a coherent definition of [A]rticle III’s case requirement”); Richard J.
Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742 (1999) (lamenting that he cannot provide
students “with a doctrinal algorithm that they can use to predict judicial decisions with a reasonable degree
of confidence”).
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explanation,”57 “radically unsatisfying,”58 and a “word game played by secret
rules.”59
“Standing” as a discrete concept is a newish creation. It is generally (though
not invariably) accepted that, before the twentieth century, standing doctrine
barely existed.60 Most lawsuits involved either private litigants suing to vindicate
private rights—generally those recognized by the common law—or public
officials vindicating public rights.61 Beginning with the New Deal, three
phenomena expanded the pool of potential plaintiffs with claims against the
government and put pressure on this system. First, the surge of statutes and
regulations accompanying the emergence of the administrative state gave rise
to large numbers of people with rights and interests not recognized at common
law.62 Second, awareness of regulatory capture led courts increasingly to
recognize that regulatory beneficiaries and competitors, in addition to

57. Fallon, supra note 30, at 1063; see also William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J.
221, 238 (1988) (arguing that “standing determinations are actually determinations on the merits”).
58. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 304
(2002).
59. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 116 (7th ed. 2015); Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,”
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 179 (1992) (describing emergence of standing “as part and parcel of the
heated struggle, in the 1920s and 1930s, within the country and the courts about the constitutional legitimacy
of the emerging regulatory state”); see also Fallon, supra note 30, at 1064 (“Through most of American legal
history, standing doctrine as we know it today—as a doctrine regulating who is a proper party to invoke the
jurisdiction of a federal court to assert a legal claim or defense . . . —did not exist.”); John A. Ferejohn &
Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962,
1009 (2002) (“There was no doctrine of standing prior to the middle of the twentieth century.”); Louis L.
Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033,
1035 (1968) (noting that historical practice permitted the non-Hohfeldian, or ideological, plaintiff and did not
require a Hohfeldian plaintiff whose own rights and interests had been impaired); James E. Pfander, Standing,
Litigable Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 196–200 (2018) (urging
that nineteenth-century federal courts’ practice of fielding claims for noncontentious relief casts doubt on the
modern understanding of the case-or-controversy requirement, which treats “case” and “controversy” as
functionally identical); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing and Social Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 309,
350 (1995) (describing standing as a creation of the New Deal that turned federal courts away from the publicand private-interest models of the prior century); cf. Re, supra note 55, at 1220 (noting that, because it was not
until the twentieth century that nontraditional interests required adaptation of the traditional justiciability
models, “modern standing’s eighteenth century British pedigree (or lack thereof) is largely beside the point”).
But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 712,
732–33 (2004) (contending that early American courts generally did not permit private plaintiffs to vindicate
public rights and that early, consistent concern for proper parties is an antecedent of modern standing
doctrine).
61. See Hessick, supra note 56, at 276; Fallon, supra note 30, at 1065; Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note
60, at 712; cf. Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131, 1141–42 (2009)
(describing the Court’s mid-twentieth-century acceptance of congressionally-conferred standing on private
litigants to vindicate the public interest); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1396 (1988) (describing private attorney general model, in addition to
private rights model, as a feature accepted at the time of the framers).
62. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 60, at 116–17; Fallon, supra note 30, at 1065; Fletcher, supra note 57,
at 225.
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regulatory targets, might have cognizable legal interests meriting protection.63
Finally, expansion of the protections of the Bill of Rights and their selective
incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to bind
the states led to an increase in litigation to vindicate widely shared constitutional
values.64 This was fine by the Warren Court, and during the “generous sixties
and seventies,” the Supreme Court “broadened dramatically the category of
who could challenge governmental action.”65
Standing doctrine emerged in reaction as pressures on the system, along
with the transition from the Warren to Burger to Rehnquist Court, led the Court
to adopt a more restrictive view of its role in the process. The Court first coined
the term “injury in fact” in a 1970 case that broadened the pool of litigants,
permitting suit so long as a plaintiff had suffered an “injury in fact” that was
“arguably within the zone of interests” of a regulatory statute.66 Two years later,
Sierra Club v. Morton67 clarified that, even if plaintiff was within this zone of
statutory interests, “the party seeking review must himself have suffered an
injury” so as to preclude “judicial review at the behest of organizations or

63. See Caleb Nelson, “Standing” and Remedial Rights in Administrative Law, 105 VA. L. REV. 703, 785
(2019) (describing how appreciation for risks of agency capture made judicial review of agency action “more
attractive to liberals”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1039, 1047 (1997) (describing late-1960s loss of faith in agencies that was not accompanied by a loss of faith
in activist government, which led to greater role for courts); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1684–85 (1975) (noting agency critics’ settled concerns that
agencies are beholden to regulated interests at the expense of interests of “consumers, environmentalists, and
the poor”); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Fortuity and the Article III “Case”: A Critique of Fletcher’s The Structure
of Standing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 289, 299–300 (2013) (describing abandonment of the “legal interest” test under
the Warren Court in favor of “newfangled,” more “abstract and generalized” injuries); Sunstein, supra note
60, at 183–84 (describing how perception of regulatory capture gave rise to the notion that beneficiaries could
suffer actionable legal harm through regulatory nonfeasance); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of
Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1443 (1988) (observing that the prospect of agency nonfeasance and
regulatory capture gave rise to robust role for judicial checks on administrative behavior). See generally Ass’n
of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 155 (1970) (approving standing without an
explicit statutory grant where litigant was “within the class of persons that the statutory provision was
designed to protect”).
64. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 60, at 116–17; Fallon, supra note 30, at 1065; Hessick, supra note 56,
at 286–87; Fletcher, supra note 57, at 225. See generally Elizabeth Earle Beske, Rethinking the Nonprecedential
Opinion, 65 UCLA L. REV. 808, 828–29 (2018) (characterizing Warren Court’s activism as a shift in the Court’s
perception of the judicial function).
65. Patricia M. Wald, The D.C. Circuit: Here and Now, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718, 719 (1987).
66. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152–53. Data Processing was the first case to employ “injury in fact” in
the standing context. See Magill, supra note 61, at 1161. Sunstein unsparingly criticizes Data Processing for
leaving “obscure” standing’s connection to Article III and for inadequately explaining and grounding its
approach. See Sunstein, supra note 60, at 186. Although the case supplied the now-familiar restrictive element
with a name, the zone of interests test initially expanded the ranks of plaintiffs eligible to file suit. See Hessick,
supra note 56, at 294–95; Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 60, at 1010; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing
as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 888–89 (1983). Caleb Nelson has
argued that Data Processing is widely misunderstood to confer remedial rights on anyone who satisfies the
Court’s test; he argues instead that the loose standard articulated by the Court was a preliminary screening
mechanism that was distinct from “the merits”—that is, whether plaintiff had a cause of action. See Nelson,
supra note 63, at 709–10, 763.
67. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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individuals who seek to do no more than vindicate their own value
preferences.”68 On its heels came Warth v. Seldin,69 which expressly grounded
the new injury-in-fact element in Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement70 and emphasized the additional elements of causation and
redressability.71
Development of standing’s intellectual underpinnings followed. In 1983,
then-Judge Antonin Scalia published an essay that connected robust
enforcement of the standing requirement under Article III to the separation of
powers.72 Scalia’s central thesis was that standing restricts the unelected federal
judiciary to its “undemocratic” role of protecting individuals from injury at the
behest of elected majorities and precludes it from the “even more
undemocratic” role of venturing into the political process.73 Where a plaintiff’s
injury is widely shared and not unique, Scalia contended, his sole recourse is to
persuade like-minded actors to vote for his cause through ordinary political
means.74
The Court embraced a separation-of-powers rationale for standing in Allen
v. Wright75 and adopted Scalia’s vision wholesale in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.76
In Allen, the Court noted that “[t]he idea of separation of powers that underlies
standing doctrine” prevents courts from acting as “virtually continuing
monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive action.”77 In Lujan, the
68. Id. at 738, 740.
69. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
70. See id. at 498–99.
71. See id. at 505–07. Under Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, it is canonically accepted
that federal courts resolve abstract legal questions only as a “necessary byproduct” of actual disputes between
two parties. See Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement,
93 HARV. L. REV. 297, 300 (1979); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1366 (1973) (noting that the Court’s opinions reflect the idea that “judicial intervention
should occur only when unavoidably necessary”).
72. Scalia, supra note 66, at 894–97. For an analysis of Justice Scalia’s imprint on standing doctrine, see
generally James E. Pfander, Scalia’s Legacy: Originalism and Change in the Law of Standing, 6 BRIT. J. AM. LEG.
STUD. 85 (2017). Pfander finds that, while he lost a few skirmishes, Justice Scalia “broadly succeeded in remaking the law of standing along the lines sketched in his 1983 [e]ssay.” Id. at 98. Pfander notes that Scalia
found little textual hook for his standing concept, anchoring it in Article III’s case-or-controversy
requirement “(for want of a better vehicle),” and made little effort to justify his conception of standing by
reference to historical practice. See id. at 91.
73. Scalia, supra note 66, at 894.
74. See id.
75. 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
76. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
77. 468 U.S. at 759–60; see also id. at 752 (stating that standing “is built on a single basic idea—the idea
of separation of powers”). As subsequent cases would reflect, the “single basic idea” of separation of powers
proved elusive as the Justices appeared to embrace varying ideas about what it entailed. See generally Heather
Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460 (2008) (identifying three separate and distinct
separation-of-powers rationales underlying standing and arguing that existing doctrine serves none of them
well). Elliott recounts that standing is variously justified as (1) promoting concrete adversity between litigants
with a personal stake in the case, (2) diverting from the courts cases involving generalized grievances better
resolved through the political system, and (3) protecting the executive branch against incursions on its
authority to enforce the law. See id. at 468.
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Court denied standing to environmental groups suing under the Endangered
Species Act’s citizen suit provision, again announcing that the courts would not
litigate “the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance
with the law.”78 The Court reminded that, notwithstanding congressional
authorization, the Constitution required that plaintiffs’ claimed injury be
“concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical.’”79
Individual cases over the next decades revealed great rifts in the Justices’
approaches to standing, particularly in the context of more widely shared
grievances. In FEC v. Akins,80 the Court held that a group of voters had
standing to challenge the FEC’s determination that the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a “political committee” required to make
membership and financial disclosures.81 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court,
found that “the fact that a political forum may be more readily available where
an injury is widely shared . . . does not, by itself, automatically disqualify an
interest for Article III purposes.”82 Justice Scalia dissented bitterly, complaining
that Akins’s injury was undifferentiated from that of any other voter.83 In
Massachusetts v. EPA, a 5–4 Court approved standing for Massachusetts as an
owner of coastal property to challenge the EPA’s “abdication” of enforcement
authority under the Clean Air Act.84 Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued
that the threatened injury, global warming, “may ultimately affect nearly
everyone on the planet,” and the very concept “seems inconsistent with [the]
particularization requirement.”85
Most recently, the Court has strengthened its supervision over Congress’s
ability to create rights for which a violation gives rise to injury in fact. In Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins86 and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,87 the Court evaluated claimed
violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, which requires consumer
78. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577.
79. Id. at 560 (citations omitted).
80. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
81. Id. at 26.
82. Id. at 24.
83. See id. at 36 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
85. Id. at 535, 541 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Professor Richard Fallon has noted standing’s
“accelerated fragmentation . . . into a multitude of varied, complexly related subdoctrines.” Fallon, supra note
30, at 1061. Judge Fletcher has described standing as “a set of loosely linked proto-doctrines.” William A.
Fletcher, Standing: Who Can Sue to Enforce a Legal Duty?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 277, 278 (2013). Professor Richard
Re has intriguingly argued that many of these disparate results can be rationalized under the construct of
relative standing. See generally Re, supra note 55. Re notes that the Court frequently loosens the requirements
of standing where no superior plaintiffs exist to the party before the court and raises the bar where the
plaintiff, though injured, has an inferior claim to that of other parties. See, e.g., id. at 1224 (noting that the
Court approved standing for a white defendant to challenge a prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to
remove black venirepersons because no other party was better situated to raise the claim).
86. 578 U.S. 330 (2016).
87. 141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
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reporting agencies to employ “reasonable procedures to assure maximum
possible accuracy” of consumer reports and authorizes liability for willful failure
to comply.88 Spokeo found that, despite the broad citizen suit provision, legally
sufficient injury—either tangible or intangible—must “actually exist.”89 The
Court remanded the plaintiff’s claim that an online information aggregator had
published inaccurate information about him in violation of the Act so the Ninth
Circuit could ponder whether his injury, concededly particularized, was also
“concrete.”90 Not all errors, the Court reasoned, were “real” harm; a misprinted
zip code, for example, was almost surely insufficient to support a federal
lawsuit.91 Spokeo reaffirmed that a plaintiff must come forward with a high
likelihood of something that looks like harm in the traditional sense, even where
his injury is unique to him and Congress has broadly authorized the suit.
TransUnion entrenched this judicial supervision. In TransUnion, the Court
reaffirmed Spokeo’s holding and approach, holding that a class of litigants whose
creditors had erroneously told third parties they were on a terror watchlist had
standing to sue, while those whose status had not been disclosed to third parties
did not.92
Spokeo and TransUnion offer an approach to the identification of harm that
places the judiciary in the driver’s seat.93 At issue were intangible injuries, not
good, old-fashioned physical and economic harms.94 To assess whether
statutory violations give rise to concrete harm, the Court instructed that lower
courts should first look to historical analogues, as harms that have traditionally
been understood to supply a basis for a lawsuit at common law are likely
concrete.95 Second, the court should tip its hat, but not defer, to the judgment
of Congress, for its views are “instructive and important.”96 Finally, the Court’s
88. 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b), 1681n(a).
89. 578 U.S. at 340.
90. Id. at 340–43.
91. Id. at 342. Commentators have criticized the conclusion that a misprinted zip code inflicts no
injury. See, e.g., Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 233, 241–42 (2017) (citing studies
that an erroneous zip code can affect job prospects, access to credit, insurance rates, and voter eligibility).
92. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2208–10 (2021).
93. Elsewhere, I have heavily criticized this approach. See Elizabeth Earle Beske, Charting a Course Past
Spokeo and TransUnion, 29 GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
94. See Spokeo, 578 U.S at 340–41; see also Rachel Bayefsky, Constitutional Injury and Tangibility, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 2285, 2325 (2018) (“The tangible/intangible distinction, thus understood, creates two tiers
of harm: one category of ‘obvious’ harm and one category of harm, the reality of which requires a more
complex inquiry.”). Bayefsky aptly criticizes this tidy dichotomy by noting that physical and economic harms
have not invariably given rise to an actionable claim in the past. See id. at 2327–29. For an in-depth and critical
discussion of Spokeo, see William Baude, Standing in the Shadow of Congress, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 197, 226–27
(2017) (concluding that the Court’s effort to “identify the subset of statutory rights that vaguely resemble the
common law” is “a misstep”).
95. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41. The Court cited by way of example the Vermont Agency case
approving of standing for qui tam plaintiffs, which relied in part on the device’s 700-year-old pedigree. Id.
(citing Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775–77 (2000)).
96. Id. at 341. The Court left the status of purely procedural rights in some doubt, reaffirming that
Congress has the ability to create new rights, violations of which may give rise to standing, but qualifying that
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ipse dixit about the harmlessness of zip code errors suggests a considerable role
for common sense.97 The TransUnion Court doubled down, again directing
courts to compare novel assertions of intangible injury to common law
analogues and, in its application, concluding that some deviations from the
common law might give rise to actionable harm,98 while others surely would
not.99 The Court offered no guiding principle by which to distinguish actionable
from nonactionable harm, thus again vesting the lower courts with considerable
judicial discretion in policing boundaries. Rather than rationalizing and
clarifying a doctrine already subject to criticism, then, the Court’s most recent
moves have engendered more confusion, as several lower court judges have
lamented post-Spokeo.100
C. Justiciability, Separation of Powers, and the Rehnquist Court
We are left with two different doctrines, each of which is subject to
criticism, each of which has over time enjoyed varying reception and diverse
justifications, and each of which can be deployed to keep certain disputes out
of the federal courts. Associate and then-Chief Justice Rehnquist was very wary
of a role for federal courts in the adjudication of disputes where coordinate
branches were feature players, and he deployed, or attempted to deploy, both
the political question doctrine and standing in order to circumscribe
institutional players’ authority to bring such cases.101 A product of the
Watergate era,102 Rehnquist embraced a prudential approach that focused on
these must be connected to a risk of underlying harm. Id. at 341–42. That harm, presumably, is harm in the
traditional sense. See id. This now-required nexus between a prophylactic procedural right and the risk of
more conventional harm it seeks to prevent will narrow the category of actionable procedural rights and may
give rise to a more robust redressability inquiry in the procedural context going forward. Cf. Barnett, supra
note 35, at 694–96 (arguing, pre-Spokeo, that individual standing to bring separation-of-powers claims is
analogous to “procedural challenges for which Article III relaxes or ignores its otherwise mandatory
desiderata”).
97. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342; see also Yeager v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 237 F. Supp. 3d 1211,
1217 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (noting role of common sense in Spokeo inquiry and surmising “one should not be
distracted by minnows when the aim of the statute is trout”).
98. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2209 (2021) (rejecting TransUnion’s argument
that plaintiffs had not suffered actionable harm because the inclusion of their names on the terror watchlist
was “not literally false,” even though falsity was a key requirement of common-law defamation).
99. See id. at 2209–10 (concluding that plaintiffs who could not establish disclosure of their watchlist
status to third parties could not establish actionable harm because “[p]ublication is ‘essential to liability’” in a
common-law defamation suit).
100. See, e.g., Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110, 1121 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J.,
concurring) (arguing, after Spokeo, that “our current Article III standing doctrine can’t be correct—as a matter
of text, history, or logic”); Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917, 957–58 (11th Cir. 2020) (en
banc) (Jordan, J., dissenting) (noting “how far standing doctrine has drifted from its beginnings and from
constitutional first principles”).
101. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment);
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
102. Rehnquist served as head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel in the Nixon
Administration from January 1969 to October 1971. JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND
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the unseemliness of federal courts jumping into the fray.103 In the Burger Court,
Rehnquist’s view that the federal courts ought to stand down and let vying
branches work it out through the political process initially failed to gain
traction.104 Over time, and as personnel changed, Rehnquist’s views found a
steady cohort.105
1. Political Question Cases in the Rehnquist Era
Associate Justice Rehnquist joined a Court in 1972 that was relatively
comfortable navigating interbranch disputes. In the waning days of the Warren
Court, before Rehnquist’s tenure, the Court’s first brush with the political
question doctrine in a case involving the actions of a coordinate branch rejected
application of the doctrine to preclude a judicial role.106 Adam Clayton Powell,
elected to Congress, challenged the House’s refusal to allow him to take his seat
due to alleged financial improprieties.107 The House had asserted the authority
of each house of Congress to “Judge . . . the . . . Qualifications of its own
Members.”108 The district court109 and the court of appeals110 invoked the
political question doctrine to preclude the exercise of jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court reversed in a 7-1 decision.111 Carefully examining English
precedent, records of the Convention, and post-ratification history, the Court
concluded that the Constitution authorized the House to judge only those
qualifications that it specifically enumerated in Article I, Section 2 and did not
confer on Congress discretion to exclude a member for any other reason.112
While Powell took the six Baker v. Carr factors as its point of departure, the
opinion devoted over thirty pages to analysis of whether the Constitution had

TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN ROBERTS 53 (2019). Joan Biskupic described Rehnquist as a
“political insider whose service in the Nixon White House helped shape his hard-right outlook.” Id. at 46.
103. Judge Bybee and Tuan Samahon have likened Rehnquist’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence to
the riddle of the Sphinx, “a difficult creature to characterize, arguably evolving over time” and culminating
in a late stage that lacked any unifying principle. Jay S. Bybee & Tuan N. Samahon, William Rehnquist, the
Separation of Powers, and the Riddle of the Sphinx, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2006).
104. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002–06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment). Then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist commanded three votes in Goldwater, not the four additional votes he needed. See infra notes
125–128 and accompanying text.
105. See Raines, 521 U.S. 811. See infra notes 167–181 and accompanying text.
106. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 (1969).
107. See id. at 490.
108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
109. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 359–60 (D.D.C. 1967), aff’d, 395 F.2d 577 (D.C. Cir.
1968), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
110. Powell v. McCormack, 395 F.2d 577, 593–96 (D.C. Cir. 1968), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 395
U.S. 486 (1969).
111. Powell, 395 U.S. at 549–50. Justice Abe Fortas, himself embroiled in scandal, did not participate
in the case and resigned the month before it issued. See Justice’s Resignation First Under Impeachment Threat, in CQ
ALMANAC 1969, at 136–37 (25th ed., 1970), http://library.cqpress.com/cqalmanac/cqal69-1247815.
112. Powell, 395 U.S. at 550.
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committed the matter to congressional discretion113 and relegated the more
prudential, Bickelian factors to a scant two paragraphs under the subheading,
“Other Considerations.”114 The Court firmly rejected the Speaker’s contention
that it ought to stay its hand because judicial resolution would “produce a
‘potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches’ of the
Federal Government.”115 Its decision “require[d] no more than an
interpretation of the Constitution.”116
A divided Burger Court muddied these waters in Goldwater v. Carter,117 in
which then-Associate Justice Rehnquist articulated a starkly different view of
the judicial function. In 1978, President Carter announced that the United
States would recognize the People’s Republic of China as the sole government
of China and withdraw from its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.118 Senator
Barry Goldwater and fourteen other members of Congress filed suit in district
court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the President from
terminating the treaty without congressional consent.119 The district court ruled
that the President could not unilaterally terminate a treaty without the advice
and consent of the Senate or the approval of both houses of Congress.120 The
D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed.121 Like the district court, the en banc
majority found the matter justiciable, but it concluded that the Constitution did
not require the President to involve Congress in the withdrawal from a treaty.122
The Supreme Court vacated the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in a terse, two-sentence
order and remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the

113. See id. at 518–48.
114. Id. at 548–49. This led some commentators to opine that the prudential factors had receded in
importance. See Barkow, supra note 45, at 269 (observing that “[p]rudential factors had no bearing on the
Court’s decision,” which left “some to question whether that strand of the doctrine had died completely”);
Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political
Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1213 n.51 (2002) (noting that “it would not have been difficult to say
that deciding the merits of the question presented in Powell v. McCormack would express a lack of respect for
the House of Representatives, and yet the Court did not do so”).
115. Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
116. Id.
117. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
118. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc) (per curiam), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
119. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp.
949 (D.D.C. 1979) (Civ. A. No. 78-2412). Although the Supreme Court did not appear to question the
Senators’ standing to bring the suit, there was contemporaneous discomfort with the courts having a role in
resolving the dispute. See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. 32,527 (1979) (statement of Sen. Javits) (stating that he was
“very unhappy . . . to see the procedures of the Senate and the relationships between the Senate and the
President under the Constitution determined by a court”). See generally Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court:
The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241, 242–43 (1981) (describing judges’ “acute[] aware[ness] of the problems
inherent in these suits.”).
120. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 965 (D.D.C. 1979), rev’d, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979), vacated, 444
U.S. 996 (1979).
121. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 709.
122. See id.
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complaint.123 In the separate accompanying opinions, the Court split 4-4 on
whether the case presented a political question.124
Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion for himself and three
colleagues expressing the view that the case was “political,” and thus
“nonjusticiable because it involve[d] the authority of the President in the
conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to which the Senate
or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.”125 He made
much of the Constitution’s silence regarding treaty abrogation and found that,
where the Constitution did not spell the answer out, the judiciary lacked
manageable standards.126 He saw no special role for the Court to “settle a
dispute between coequal branches of our Government, each of which has
resources available to protect and assert its interests.”127 Although Rehnquist
found no fifth vote, his vision of the political question doctrine and the judicial
role deviated sharply from the confident approach taken in Powell. Two
coordinate branches had squared off over whether the Constitution permitted
one of them to act without involving the other, and Rehnquist, with three
colleagues, was prepared to throw up his hands and declare the federal judiciary
powerless to resolve the dispute.128
He faced formidable counterargument. On the other side, Justice Powell129
sharply denied the case involved a nonjusticiable political question.130 Powell
argued that the case “concern[ed] only the constitutional division of power
between Congress and the President” and “only requires us to apply normal
principles of interpretation.”131 He pointed to other separation-of-powers cases,
like Powell, in which the Court had manifested “willingness . . . to decide
whether one branch of our Government has impinged upon the power of
another” and saw no reason to deviate from that course.132 That the
Constitution’s text did not clearly resolve the matter was of no moment; it was

123. Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996.
124. See id. Justice Marshall simply concurred in the result, joining no other opinions, and thus did not
show his hand. Id.
125. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
126. See id. at 1003.
127. Id. at 1004.
128. Professor Harlan Cohen colorfully noted that Rehnquist:
[S]crunch[ed] all six [of the Baker factors] into a ball, finding that the issue was left to the other
branches of government in part because there was no clear constitutional answer and in part
because foreign relations and national security raised particular concerns about policy space,
embarrassment, finality, and speaking with one voice.
Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13 (2017).
129. Justice Powell had supplied the fifth vote to vacate on the basis that the matter was unripe before
the Senate voted on a resolution disapproving the President’s actions. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996 (Powell,
J., concurring).
130. See id. at 999.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1001.
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the Court’s role to engage in “interstitial” analysis, an ordinary method of
constitutional interpretation.133 Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice White,
dissented on the grounds that he wanted to hear the case, thus agreeing that the
case was justiciable.134 Justice Brennan, in dissent, charged Justice Rehnquist
with “profoundly misapprehend[ing]” the political question doctrine, which
had no application to “the antecedent question whether a particular branch has
been constitutionally designated as the repository of political decisionmaking
power.”135
Although Rehnquist’s Goldwater rallying cry lost traction over the next
couple of cases,136 he was able to set aside this role of boundary cop, writing as
Chief, in Nixon v. United States.137 In Nixon, the Court held that the political
question doctrine precluded jurisdiction over a challenge to the Senate’s
impeachment proceedings of a federal judge.138 Admittedly, Nixon was
“perhaps the most powerful case” for application of the doctrine given the
involvement of a federal judge,139 and the result was unanimous. Walter Nixon,
convicted of bribery, filed suit in federal court challenging a Senate rule that
permitted a Senate committee, rather than the full Senate, to hold evidentiary
hearings in his impeachment trial.140 Nixon argued that the Senate rule violated
the Senate’s obligation under Article I, Section 3 to “try” all impeachments.141
The Court’s various opinions reflected sharp divisions on the approach to the
political question doctrine, but significantly, the Chief again favored the most
133. Id. at 1000.
134. Id. at 1006 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part).
135. Id. at 1006–07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
136. The next litigants to cry “political question” in the separation-of-powers sphere garnered not a
single vote for nonjusticiability. In the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996),
Congress had authorized the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) to suspend deportation
proceedings upon a showing of “extreme hardship” but required the Attorney General to submit a report of
the suspension to Congress, which either house had the power to override. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (repealed
1996). Jagdish Rai Chadha obtained such a suspension, and the House passed a resolution vetoing it and
ordering his deportation. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 418–19 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). He
appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit, which found the legislative veto provision unconstitutional and
suspended Chadha’s deportation, and the Supreme Court affirmed. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The
7–2 majority acknowledged that the Constitution confers plenary authority on Congress over naturalization
in Article I but firmly claimed its role in keeping Congress within its constitutional boundaries. See id. at 941–
43. “[T]he presence of constitutional issues with significant political overtones,” the Court reasoned, neither
triggers the political question doctrine nor permits a court to evade its responsibility to ascertain whether a
coordinate branch has overstepped its authority. Id. at 942–43. Justice White and then-Associate Justice
Rehnquist dissented on the merits but had no quibble with the Court’s determination that the matter was
justiciable. See id. at 1002 (White, J., dissenting), 1013–16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also United States v.
Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393 (1990) (“[T]he fact that one institution of Government has mechanisms
available to guard against incursions into its power by other governmental institutions does not require that
the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy . . . .”).
137. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
138. See id. at 237–38.
139. Barkow, supra note 45, at 273.
140. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227–28.
141. See id. at 228.
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limited-to-nonexistent role for federal courts. He concluded that the
Constitution had given the Senate “sole” power to try impeachments, the word
“try” was too vague to give rise to judicially manageable standards, and judicial
involvement of any kind in impeachment proceedings was inconsistent with the
constitutional scheme.142 Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, sought to
reserve a role for the judiciary in the event the Senate exceeded its discretion,
for example, by adjudicating impeachments via coin toss.143 The Chief’s opinion
removed the topic completely from the judicial purview, rejecting even that
outer-boundary patrol role. Nixon was the Rehnquist Court’s last
pronouncement on the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine under the Rehnquist Court reflects a steady
push and pull amongst its members between the belief in a Court singularly
suited to patrol the outer boundaries of coordinate-branch power and the far
more reticent view, championed by Rehnquist himself, that coordinate
branches are best left to their own devices. Rehnquist’s proffered Goldwater
approach signaled his belief that, where the Constitution itself provides no clear
answer, the judiciary is ill-suited to step into the fray. That view commanded
insufficient votes in 1979, but by 1993, the idea that, at least in certain cases,
the judiciary ought to have no role in delineating the outermost boundaries of
congressional authority—even in the face of Justice Souter’s hypothesized
dereliction of constitutional duty—found an additional five.144 The Court’s
enthusiasm for playing the role of arbiter-in-chief, delineator of lines, left the
’90s in some doubt, and lower courts took heed. After Nixon, the Supreme
Court avoided the political question doctrine altogether for nearly two decades,
rejecting petitions for certiorari even as lower courts increasingly invoked it.145

142. See id. at 229–35. Justice White, joined by Justice Blackmun, wrote an opinion reminiscent of the
Henkin approach. He would have reached the merits but concluded that the Senate had not exceeded its
constitutionally conferred discretion in trying Nixon. See id. at 239 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. See id. at 253–54 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
144. See id.
145. See, e.g., Taylor v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 658 F.3d 402, 407, 411–12 (4th Cir. 2011)
(holding that political question doctrine precluded a serviceman’s suit against a private business for injuries
sustained on base); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 844 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied,
562 U.S. 1178 (2011) (invoking political question doctrine to avoid resolving Federal Tort Claims case after
bombing of Sudanese factory); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d 1260, 1262–64 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 549 U.S. 1206 (2007) (holding that political question doctrine precludes claims against United States
for support of 1970 Chilean coup); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 436 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied,
549 U.S. 1166 (2007) (using political question doctrine to avoid resolving claim relating to depopulation of
island to create Diego Garcia military base); Custer Cnty. Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1127 (2002) (applying political question doctrine to preclude plaintiffs’
challenge to the Colorado Airspace Initiative); Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1302
(11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1039 (2001) (invoking political question doctrine to avoid deciding what
is a “treaty” requiring Senate ratification); New Jersey v. United States, 91 F.3d 463, 469–70 (3d Cir. 1996)
(using political question doctrine to avoid resolving whether state could recover costs incurred in educating
and incarcerating illegal immigrants). See generally Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of
Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925 (2015) (observing that lower courts “have applied this
doctrine especially generously, even in the context of statutory interpretation and international law”);
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2. Standing in Separation-of-Powers Cases
The Rehnquist Court’s one and only direct pronouncement on institutional
standing, Raines v. Byrd,146 was a doozy, and it continues to reverberate and shape
the landscape today. Understanding Raines requires some context.
The Court first encountered legislative standing in 1939 in Coleman v.
Miller.147 Raines begrudgingly preserved Coleman,148 so it is an important first
piece of the puzzle. In Coleman, the Kansas Senate had split 20–20 on a vote to
ratify the Child Labor Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.149 The lieutenant
governor had provided a tie-breaking vote to ratify the amendment, and the
twenty senators who had voted against ratification filed suit in state court
challenging the lieutenant governor’s right to participate.150 The state supreme
court upheld the tie-breaking vote, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari.151 The Court found the senators had standing because their votes
“would have been sufficient to defeat ratification,” and, having not led to that
defeat, thus had been “held for naught.”152 The Court determined that the

Mulhern, supra note 50, at 106–07 (noting that lower courts have invoked the doctrine to avoid resolving
divisive issues and that the Supreme Court avoided entering the fray by denying certiorari).
146. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
147. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
148. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 823–24.
149. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36.
150. See id. at 436.
151. See id. at 437. The “[O]pinion of the Court” of Chief Justice Hughes commanded only two votes
and rejected the state senators’ lawsuit on other grounds. See id. at 435. Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment in which he, joined by three Justices, contended that the state legislators
lacked standing. See id. at 469–70 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Because the portion of Coleman addressing
standing did not command a majority, one commentator opined that “Coleman’s authority as precedent for
modern congressional standing cases is problematic.” R. Lawrence Dessem, Congressional Standing to Sue: Whose
Vote is This, Anyway?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1986). Subsequent to Dessem’s article, the Supreme
Court put Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion on more solid footing in Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. at 822 (1997), and
again in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 576 U.S. 787, 804 n.13 (2015).
152. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438. Tara Leigh Grove has argued a different interpretation of Coleman. See
Tara Leigh Grove, Government Standing and the Fallacy of the Institutional Injury, supra note 37. Noting that the
institutional plaintiffs filed their case in state court, she says, “Coleman should be understood as a case in which
the Supreme Court applied a now-outdated rule of appellate standing to hear a federal constitutional challenge
from a state court.” Id. at 651. Grove cites Frankfurter’s concurring opinion, in which he contends that the
state legislators would not have had Article III standing in state court and thus should not have had standing
on appeal and claims that he articulated what would become the modern rule. See id. at 654–55; see also William
A. Fletcher, The “Case or Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. REV.
263, 275–76 (1990) (claiming that Frankfurter’s Coleman concurrence established the principle that the
Supreme Court is bound by Article III even when it fields appeals from state courts that are not). There is
definitely room for Grove’s argument given the Hughes majority’s contrast between Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S.
130 (1922), where the Court reviewed on appeal from state court a challenge to the ratification of an
amendment, and Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), where the Court refused to review a New York
voter’s federal challenge to ratification of an amendment on the basis that he asserted only a generalized
grievance. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 440–41. However, Hughes also was at pains to note that the senators had a
“plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,” id. at 438, and he observed
that this interest was more “impressive” than the interests of the litigants in Leser. Id. at 441. Whether or not
Leser meant ability to sue in state court automatically conferred standing on appeal to the Supreme Court,
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senators’ interest in “maintaining the effectiveness of their votes” was “plain,
direct and adequate”153 and that the case was no “mere intra-parliamentary
controversy.”154 Subsequent courts have invoked aspects of Coleman to various
ends, so there are several features worth noting. First, the votes at issue actually
had been cast, and the lieutenant governor’s vote voided them entirely.155
Second, the Senate itself did not sue in an institutional capacity. Third, all twenty
affected senators sued, and their collected votes, if counted and not subject to
the tie break, would have changed the outcome.156 Finally, the twenty senators’
dispute was not with fellow legislators but with the action of an executive
actor.157 The case thus was not an effort to export an intra-senate dispute into
the judicial branch.
The Supreme Court’s initial encounters with congressional standing after
Coleman generally found legislator standing unproblematic. The Court saw no
justiciability impediment in Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s challenge to the House
resolution denying him a seat, which is unsurprising given Powell’s obvious
claim to individual, not institutional, harm.158 In Buckley v. Valeo,159 plaintiffs
challenging the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 included a presidential
candidate, a sitting U.S. Senator, a potential contributor, and several state
parties.160 Without elaboration, the Court satisfied itself that “at least some of”
them had standing, citing Coleman amongst other cases.161 As focused as it was
on the justiciability question in Goldwater v. Carter, the Court did not consider
standing.162 In INS v. Chadha,163 the Court found that the intervention of the

then, the Hughes majority arguably found an interest sufficient to satisfy Article III in the invalidation of the
senators’ votes. See generally John Harrison, Legislative Power, Executive Duty, and Legislative Lawsuits, 31 J.L. &
POL. 103, 122 n.73 (2015) (noting that at the time of Coleman, “as now, the Court was not always rigorous in
distinguishing between constitutional limits on jurisdiction, statutory limits on jurisdiction, and causes of
action”).
153. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438.
154. Id. at 441.
155. See id. at 438.
156. See id. Matthew Hall has argued that any one of these senators was deprived of the right to have
his vote counted and thus even a single senator should have had standing. See Matthew I. Hall, Making Sense
of Legislative Standing, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 30 (2016). As explained infra, requiring an outcome-determinative
number of participants minimizes the risk of interference in the political process.
157. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 436.
158. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517, 547–48 (1969) (concluding that Powell had sought
appropriate relief and that the political question doctrine did not preclude review); see also Hall, supra note
156, at 24–25 (characterizing Powell as a conventional individual standing case).
159. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
160. See id. at 7–8.
161. Id. at 12 & n.10. That the Court cited Coleman at least suggests that the presence of legislators
reinforced the claim to standing, but it does not prove it outright.
162. See McGowan, supra note 119, at 256 (observing that the Supreme Court “made no use of the
term” standing in its decision, which the author thought suggested that use of standing as a mechanism for
judicial restraint “may have passed insofar as these lawsuits are concerned”).
163. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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two Houses of Congress as “adverse parties” helped render the dispute
justiciable given the INS’s agreement with Mr. Chadha that the legislative veto
provision was unconstitutional.164 In Bowsher v. Synar,165 the presence of the
National Treasury Employees Union, whose standing on behalf of its members
was uncontroversial, allowed the Court to bypass the question whether
members of Congress also had standing to challenge the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.166
Raines v. Byrd167 represented the Supreme Court’s first direct reencounter
with legislative standing since 1939. Raines involved a challenge by six members
of Congress to the Line Item Veto Act,168 which enabled the President to
“cancel” a spending and tax benefit measure after signing it into law if the
President determined that doing so would reduce the federal budget deficit
without impairing the national interest.169 Plaintiffs, four Senators and two
members of the House who had voted against the bill, filed suit the day after
its passage in district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that the lineitem veto violated Article I of the Constitution.170 The district court found their
claim of diluted voting power sufficient to confer standing and held that the

164. See id. at 930–31, 931 n.6.
165. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
166. See id. at 721. The D.C. Circuit faced the lion’s share of suits by members of Congress in the
1970s and 1980s and spent two decades shaping an approach without intervention from on high. The Court
extended the definition of injury beyond the vote cancellation recognized in Coleman to process-based defects
and initially held that even individual legislators could have standing to raise institutional claims. In Kennedy v.
Sampson, Senator Kennedy filed suit against the Administrator of the General Services Administration seeking
a declaration that President Nixon’s attempted pocket veto of a bill had not been effective. 511 F.2d 430, 432
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The court rejected the claim that only Congress as a whole, or one of its houses, had standing
to challenge the President’s action. See id. at 435. The court found sufficient interest to confer standing in the
fact that, if the pocket veto was valid, the Senator’s prior vote for the bill had lost its effect without giving
him the opportunity to override a conventional veto. See id. The D.C. Circuit struggled where the
congressional claimant’s issue was primarily with his legislative colleagues, initially denying standing and over
time finding standing but invoking equitable discretion to withhold declaratory relief. Id. at 436. In Riegle v.
Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court found that a Senator had alleged
injury-in-fact in his inability to provide advice and consent in an appointment where the methods for
appointment were creatures of statute. See id. at 878–79. After finding standing, though, the court invoked
equitable discretion to withhold relief because the plaintiff had ample means of legislative redress. See id. at
882. The D.C. Circuit’s inquiry thus conferred standing on individual members of Congress for injuries to
their institutional prerogatives but actually allowed suit to proceed only where plaintiff’s problem had its
origins outside of Congress. See, e.g., Bliley v. Kelly, 23 F.3d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding standing
and refusing to exercise equitable discretion to dismiss where members of Congress challenged actions of the
D.C. Council that deprived them of the right to review an act before it took effect, in alleged contravention
of the Home Rule Act). The D.C. Circuit reaffirmed the Kennedy holding, and refused to exercise equitable
discretion, in Barnes v. Kline. See 759 F.2d 21, 26–30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated as moot, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987).
167. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
168. See id. at 814.
169. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a), invalidated by Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
170. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.
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Act violated Article I.171 The Supreme Court took the direct, expedited appeal
prescribed by the Act and issued an opinion within thirty days.172
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court rejected
standing in the broadest possible strokes. The Court distinguished Powell v.
McCormack as a case involving a representative personally “singled out for
specially unfavorable treatment.”173 In Raines, instead, the plaintiffs raised a
claim that “[ran] (in a sense) with the Member’s seat,”174 involved no private
rights, and was “wholly abstract and widely dispersed.”175 The Court conceded
it had recognized an “institutional injury” in Coleman but found that case readily
distinguishable.176 Coleman applied to situations where “legislators whose votes
would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act . . . sue
if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the
ground that their votes have been completely nullified.”177 The Raines plaintiffs
had simply voted and lost the battle, and the Court was unwilling to extend
Coleman to encompass abstract claims of diluted legislative power.178 The Court
buttressed its decision not to extend Coleman with history, noting that major
separation-of-powers battles in the late 1860s had taken place outside the
judicial arena.179 Without further explanation, the Court cryptically “attach[ed]
some importance to the fact that appellees have not been authorized to
represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action.”180 Finally, the
Court noted that the plaintiffs had political remedies and that its decision did
not foreclose challenge by an individual who suffered particularized injury by
operation of the Act.181

171. See id. at 817. Inasmuch as the injury was inflicted by a statute, the district court’s holding violated
the then-prevailing D.C. Circuit approach. See id. at 820 n.4.
172. See id. at 817–18.
173. Id. at 821.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 829.
176. See id. at 821, 824.
177. Id. at 823.
178. See id. at 826.
179. See id. at 826–27. That President Andrew Johnson did not resort to federal court to challenge the
Tenure of Office Act, of course, was quite possibly a function of the absence of general federal question
jurisdiction in 1868. Aside from a brief and quickly-retracted dalliance with federal question jurisdiction in
the Midnight Judges Act, enacted after the contentious election of 1800, Congress did not confer general
federal question jurisdiction on the federal courts until 1875. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat.
470; Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 463–64 & n.14 (1974) (observing that the Act of 1875 conferred
federal question jurisdiction upon lower federal courts “for but the second time in their nearly century-old
history”).
180. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829.
181. See id. at 829–30. The near-certainty that a beneficiary of a spending provision “vetoed” by the
President would be forthcoming undoubtedly affected the Court’s analysis. The opportunity to resolve the
issue arrived the next year with Clinton v. City of New York. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). Raines thus is a nice example
of what Richard Re has called “relative standing”: given the likelihood that a better plaintiff would emerge,
the Court had no need to dignify the asserted institutional injury. See Re, supra note 55, at 1214–15 (suggesting
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Commentators received Raines as a near-shutdown of congressional
standing, except in situations that mirrored the Coleman or Powell facts or,
perhaps, in cases where the entire House or Senate had authorized suit.182 That
Raines achieved by different means precisely what Rehnquist had intended in
Goldwater was no accident; Raines was “informed—and indeed virtually
controlled—by political-question concerns.”183 The D.C. Circuit took heed.184
In its first post-Raines case, Chenoweth v. Clinton,185 the court confronted a suit
filed by several members of Congress challenging the President’s
implementation of an environmental program by executive order on the basis
that it deprived them of their right to debate and vote on the initiative by
legislation.186 Because the plaintiffs’ primary gripe was with the actions of the
President, not their colleagues, the case would have proceeded pre-Raines.187
The post-Raines panel found that the case did not mirror Coleman’s facts, and
the D.C. Circuit dismissed for want of standing.188
In Goldwater, in the political question doctrine context, and Raines, in the
standing context, it is possible to find lines of commonality and consistency in
the approach of William Rehnquist to disputes amongst coordinate branches.
that, instead of disclaiming injury, the courts ought to view the right to sue as a “scarce resource” and ought
to turn away some putative plaintiffs where others, with “weightier” interests, would likely emerge).
182. See, e.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11.2
(3d ed. 2008) (stating that limits imposed by Raines, “drawn from separation-of-powers concerns that mimic
political-question doctrine, may well preclude such standing entirely”); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional
Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV. 339, 342 (2015) (noting that Raines broadly suggested “that
congressional standing may be quite constrained”); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1110 (2013) (observing that, since Raines,
courts “typically find that individual members of Congress lack standing”); Note, Standing in the Way of
Separation of Powers: The Consequences of Raines v. Byrd, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1752 (1999) (stating that Raines
would at most allow standing on Coleman facts or if either or both houses of Congress sued as an institution
or specifically authorized members to sue); Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v.
Byrd and the Modern Supreme Court’s Attempt to Control Constitutional Confrontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 354 (1997)
(describing “the Court’s characterization of congressional standing as an invitation to interbranch
armageddon”).
183. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 182; see also James A. Turner, Comment, The Post-Medellín Case for
Legislative Standing, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 731, 753 (2010) (observing that, while Raines did not address the political
question doctrine, “part of the reason the Court rejected standing for the legislators was because of the
political nature of their claim”); Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1,
49 (2015) (noting that the Raines Court borrowed heavily from political question jurisprudence and that the
opinion shows that “denial of standing can perform political question’s function of diverting plaintiffs to the
legislative arena”). Lower courts have linked Raines and Goldwater in denying legislative suits. See, e.g., Kucinich
v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 10–11 (D.D.C. 2002) (rejecting legislators’ challenge to President Bush’s
unilateral withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty because they lacked standing under Raines and the
issue presented a political question under Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in Goldwater).
184. Some commentators assumed that the Supreme Court used Raines to “send a message to the D.C.
Circuit.” See Devins & Fitts, supra note 182, at 361.
185. Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
186. See id. at 113.
187. The court noted that Congress had the power prospectively to terminate the program if it was so
inclined and thus concluded that the issue was susceptible of political resolution. See id. at 116. Pre-Raines, the
D.C. Circuit would probably have fielded Chenoweth on the merits. See supra note 166.
188. See id. at 117.
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While individually harmed actors, like Powell and Chadha, could find their way
into federal court, the institutional actors themselves were relegated to their
political remedies. Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist fell short of persuading
the necessary number of colleagues in Goldwater, and thereafter set the political
question doctrine aside until Nixon when he articulated a conception of the
doctrine that disclaimed a role for the judiciary even in the outlandish case. In
Raines, he found his move, and in broad strokes, borrowing heavily from his
own political question jurisprudence, sought to eliminate institutional actors as
party plaintiffs almost entirely.
D. Justiciability, Separation of Powers, and the Roberts Court
Chief Justice Roberts clerked for then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in the
1980–1981 term,189 a year after Goldwater v. Carter, and though he assuredly was
steeped in Rehnquist’s views of the judiciary and its proper role in navigating
interbranch disputes, Roberts’s own views since assuming his position in
September 2005—at least in the political question context—have charted a
different course, somewhat defiantly reclaiming a role for the federal judiciary.
1. The Political Question Doctrine: Reembracing the Boundary Cop
In the years between Nixon v. United States190 and 2012, the lower courts
routinely invoked the political question doctrine, particularly in the foreign
policy context, to avoid separation-of-powers disputes between coordinate
branches, while the Supreme Court stayed out of the fray.191 In 2012, in the
absence of a circuit split, the Supreme Court changed course.192 In Zivotofsky
I,193 the Court confronted a clash between Congress and the executive branch
over the recognition of Jerusalem. Congress had passed a statute requiring the
State Department, upon request, to record the place of birth of a baby born in
Jerusalem as “Israel.”194 This requirement flatly contravened the State
Department’s manual, which ordered that the birthplace be recorded as
Jerusalem, specifically instructing that passport officials “not write Israel or

189. See BISKUPIC, supra note 102, at 52.
190. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
191. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
192. Without a circuit split, and with Zivotofsky losing—and thus the executive prerogative
prevailing—in both the panel majority and in Judge Edwards’s concurrence, the Court’s grant of certiorari
was surprising, leading Professor Harlan Cohen to surmise that “a large majority of the Justices (only Justice
Breyer dissented) wanted to discipline the lower courts in their use of the political question doctrine.” Cohen,
supra note 6, at 433.
193. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
194. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228, § 214(d), 116 Stat.
1350, 1366 (2002).
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Jordan.”195 In signing the statute into law, President George W. Bush claimed
that it unconstitutionally interfered with the executive branch’s recognition
power and indicated he would not enforce it.196 Menachem Zivotofsky, born in
Jerusalem after the act’s passage, challenged the State Department’s refusal to
designate his birthplace as Israel.197 The district court deemed the case a
nonjusticiable political question,198 and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.199 The panel
majority concluded that Zivotofsky had asked the court to “call into question
the President’s exercise of the recognition power.”200
In “broad and sweeping terms,”201 the Supreme Court reversed in an
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts.202 The Court saw the issue as
whether the statute was a constitutional exercise of legislative authority or
whether it “impermissibly intrude[d] upon Presidential powers under the
Constitution”203—a classic question of boundary-drawing. Examining the
constitutionality of a statute and determining whether one coordinate branch
of government “is ‘aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch,’”
the Court announced, is an appropriate exercise of judicial authority that dates
back to Marbury.204 The Court found that the parties’ arguments in the case
“sound[ed] in familiar principles of constitutional interpretation,” requiring
“careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical evidence”; this
exercise, the Court confirmed, is precisely “what courts do.”205
A case of “far-reaching significance,”206 Zivotofsky I firmly defended the
Court’s role in situations of interbranch conflict, taking us back to first
principles and to Chief Justice Marshall’s vision in Marbury. It set to rest the
confusing undercurrents exposed in Goldwater and the various opinions in
Nixon. Significantly, the Court found jurisdiction in a case even though it was
decidedly not simple,207 it involved no clear-cut constitutional rule,208 and it

195. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 191–92.
196. See Statement on Signing the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1658, 1659 (Sept. 30, 2002). This is an example of the executive branch exercising self-help
to counter a perceived incursion on its authority.
197. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 192–93.
198. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D.D.C. 2007).
199. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
200. Id. at 1232.
201. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 145, at 1925.
202. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 201.
203. Id. at 196.
204. Id. at 197 (quoting Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).
205. Id. at 201.
206. Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 145, at 1925.
207. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 201 (“To say that Zivotofsky’s claim presents issues the
Judiciary is competent to resolve is not to say that reaching a decision in this case is simple.”).
208. “A constitutional rule is a constitutional norm whose scope of application is not expected to be
subject to reasonable disagreement.” Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639, 1652 (2016).
Greene characterized Zivotofsky as a case involving “constitutional standards.” Id. at 1699. The relative roles
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touched on a “delicate subject.”209 Unlike Rehnquist and his cohort in Goldwater,
the Court was unfazed by the fact that the Constitution was silent on the subject
of recognition power.210 Remarkably, the Court did not even cite Goldwater.
Instead, it manifested comfort making “interstitial” inferences and bringing to
bear traditional methods of interpretation.211 The case required the Court to
draw difficult lines between the various foreign affairs powers meted out by the
Constitution in a somewhat overlapping fashion to two different institutional
actors. The Court was unmoved by the dominant argument in Nixon v. United
States that the Constitution, in conferring power on the President to receive
ambassadors and foreign ministers, had made an unreviewable textual
commitment of authority to another branch.212 Finally, the Court cited only two
of the Baker v. Carr factors—textual commitment of authority to another
branch and the presence or absence of judicially manageable standards213—thus
signaling that more prudential reasons for staying its hand, such as concern for
institutional legitimacy or reticence to intrude on other branches, held little
force.214
The Court dramatically reaffirmed its comfort policing boundaries in Trump
v. Mazars USA, LLP.215 Writing for the Court to resolve a dispute between
Congress and the President over the issuance of congressional subpoenas, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that presidents and Congress had spent two centuries
working out such disputes themselves, hashing them out “in the ‘hurly-burly,
the give-and-take of the political process.’”216 Though Rehnquist had cited
similar history in Raines to justify the conclusion that the federal judiciary should

of Congress and the President in foreign affairs, he reasoned, “become easier rather than harder to answer
on contact with subsequent political and social practices.” Id.
209. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 5 (2015).
210. See id. at 11 (“Despite the importance of the recognition power in foreign relations, the
Constitution does not use the term ‘recognition,’ either in Article II or elsewhere.”).
211. Cf. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (parting company with
Justice Rehnquist, who believed that constitutional silence meant a lack of judicially manageable standards,
because the Court could engage in “interstitial analysis”).
212. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. at 197.
213. See id. at 195.
214. See Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 604 (2018) (observing that
Zivotofsky I, in looking only to the first two Baker v. Carr factors, “continued the trend of diminishing [the
political question doctrine’s] scope”); Sitaraman & Wuerth, supra note 145, at 1925–26 (characterizing
Zivotofsky I as “abandon[ing] the multifactor Baker v. Carr test”); Note, Political Questions, Public Rights, and
Sovereign Immunity, 130 HARV. L. REV. 723, 725 (2016) (observing that the Court “conspicuously” omitted
“those categories most identified with prudence”).
215. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020).
216. Id. at 2029 (quoting Hearings on S. 2170 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Rels. of the S.
Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 94th Cong. 87 (1975) (statement of Antonin Scalia, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel)). The Court had called for supplemental briefing on the justiciability question, and
the parties had all agreed the case did not present a political question. See Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP,
SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/trump-v-mazars/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2022).
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play a limited role in the event of a breakdown,217 the Roberts opinion chastised
the parties a bit for their recalcitrance, noted that the controversy “is the first
of its kind to reach this Court,” and then proceeded to resolve it, rejecting both
sides’ proffered standards and laying out a series of principles circumscribing
congressional authority that specifically contemplated a role for the federal
courts.218 Once again, the Court seemed unfazed by the imprecise constitutional
underpinnings of the subpoena power and the absence of a precedential
lodestar; recognizing a breakdown in the political process, the Court dove in
and provided roadmapping principles for sorting it out.219
Reaching out in the absence of a circuit split in Zivotofsky I, after two
decades in which the Court had looked the other way, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote the opinion of the Court and announced the arrival of a new sheriff in
town.220 Together with Mazars, the Court’s most recent contribution, the
distinct approaches of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts are obvious.
Hearkening back to first principles, Roberts has reclaimed an “emphatic” role
for the federal judiciary in resolving litigation concerning the constitutional
authority of the other branches, the “political implications” that troubled his
forebear seemingly be damned.221
2. Standing to Assert Separation-of-Powers Challenges
Despite announcing a bolder conception of its own role in Zivotofsky I, one
with which Chief Justice Rehnquist would not have agreed, the Roberts Court
has largely contented itself with Rehnquist’s handiwork in Raines, tap-dancing
around it in a couple of cases and bending over backward to incentivize
individual litigants to tee up separation-of-powers issues instead.
In a series of indirect confrontations with congressional standing, the
Roberts Court has consistently worked within the Raines construct. In Arizona
State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC),222 the Court
found that a state legislature had standing to make an Elections Clause challenge
to the redistricting plan of an independent state commission created by popular

217. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826–27 (1997).
218. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031, 2035–36.
219. See id.
220. See Joshua Abbotoy, The Return of Classical Political Question Doctrine in Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky
v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012), 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 347, 357–61 (2014) (discussing the new
approach to the political question doctrine the Court took in Zivotofsky I).
221. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (“At least since Marbury v. Madison we
have recognized that when an Act of Congress is alleged to conflict with the Constitution, ‘[i]t is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.’ That duty will sometimes involve the
‘[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional authority of one of the three branches,’ but courts
cannot avoid their responsibility merely ‘because the issues have political implications.’” (alterations in
original) (citations omitted)).
222. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015).
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referendum.223 The case distinguished Raines in three ways. First, the entire
legislature was suing as an institutional plaintiff to vindicate an institutional
interest224—a fact to which the Delphic Raines Court had attached “some
importance.”225 Second, conferring the task of redistricting on an independent
commission necessitated wresting it from the state legislature altogether and
thus rendered the legislature’s putative votes on redistricting a “complete[]
nulli[ty],” as in Coleman.226 Third, the case did not involve Congress and thus
did not implicate the separation-of-powers concerns that may have undergirded
Raines.227 The opinion did not link these three points of distinction or suggest
that all were necessary components to its conclusion.
A litigation role for Congress also emerged in United States v. Windsor.228 The
Obama administration’s refusal to defend the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA)229 on appeal prompted the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG)
of the House to intervene and defend the constitutionality of DOMA before
the Supreme Court.230 In considering DOMA’s constitutionality, the Court
requested argument on the question whether BLAG had standing to appeal the
case.231 The Court ultimately sidestepped the question because it concluded that
the government’s obligation to pay a tax refund in the event the challengers
prevailed gave it the requisite stake in the proceedings.232 Invoking INS v.
Chadha,233 the Court noted that BLAG’s presence in the case ensured “sharp
adversarial presentation” and found it unnecessary to decide whether BLAG
had standing on its own behalf.234 Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas,
argued in dissent that BLAG had standing in its own right.235 He saw BLAG as
the representative of the House, unlike the six individual legislators in Raines,
and wrote that, in refusing to defend the statute, the government was holding a
majority of the House’s pro-DOMA votes “for naught.”236

223. See id. at 793.
224. See id. at 802.
225. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997).
226. Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 803.
227. See id. at n.12.
228. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
229. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
230. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753–54. BLAG is a standing body of the House of Representatives
charged with directing the House Office of General Counsel. H.R. Rule II cl. 8, 114th Cong. (2015). At the
time of Windsor, House rules gave BLAG a consultant/advisory role but did not authorize it to act on behalf
of the House. See H.R. Rule II cl. 8, 112th Cong. (2011). In response to Windsor, the House amended its rules
to make clear that BLAG “speaks for, and articulates the institutional position of, the House in all litigation
matters.” H.R. Rule II cl. 8, 114th Cong. (2015).
231. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 755.
232. See id. at 757–58.
233. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 939 (1983).
234. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 761–62.
235. See id. at 807 (Alito, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 806–07 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Most recently, the Supreme Court addressed legislative standing in Virginia
House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill,237 which asked whether the Virginia House of
Delegates, one-half of the Virginia General Assembly, could intervene to appeal
a decision invalidating a legislative districting plan as an impermissible racial
gerrymander.238 The Court noted that the case did not present Coleman votenullification issues but rather addressed “the constitutionality of a concededly
enacted redistricting plan.”239 Without Coleman facts, the key asserted distinction
from Raines was that the Virginia House itself, an official body, was seeking to
litigate. Because the Virginia House represented only a part of the General
Assembly charged with redistricting authority, the Court found the situation
distinguishable from that in AIRC in which both the Arizona House and Senate
had filed suit.240 The Court determined that this “mismatch” between the body
seeking to litigate and the body whose votes were purportedly undermined
made this case more like the six individual members suing in Raines.241 The
Court concluded that “[o]ne House of [a] bicameral legislature cannot alone
continue the litigation against the will of its partners in the legislative
process.”242 Justice Alito, joined this time by three Justices, again dissented and
would have found standing.243 He argued that Raines “rested heavily on federal
separation-of-powers concerns, which [were] notably absent.”244
To date, the Roberts Court has paid lip service to Raines on multiple
occasions, frequently finding points of distinction, but has not confronted
institutional standing head-on. Perhaps because of existing obstacles to suits by
institutional actors, the Court has instead preferred individual litigants in
fielding separation-of-powers questions. The Court has entertained several
kinds of claims that Congress has infringed on the power of the judicial branch.
Individual litigants have repeatedly pressed claims that Congress has
unconstitutionally conferred Article III business on Article I actors.245 The
Court has fielded claims that Congress has impermissibly dictated the rules of

237. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
238. See id. at 1949–50.
239. Id. at 1954. The Court did not purport to limit Coleman in Virginia House; it simply found the case
inapplicable given the absence of vote nullification. Id.
240. See id.
241. Id. at 1953–54.
242. Id. at 1956.
243. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and
Justice Kavanaugh. Id.
244. Id. at 1958 (Alito, J., dissenting).
245. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Servs. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018)
(upholding inter partes review of patent validity at the agency level because the matter involved “public rights”);
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 674–75 (2015) (holding that non-Article III bankruptcy
courts may hear private rights claims if parties consent); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 487–88 (2011)
(holding that non-Article III bankruptcy court may not hear traditional private rights claims where it is not
acting as an adjunct).
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decision in a pending case.246 Finally, the Court has encountered challenges to
congressional efforts to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.247 In each of
these cases, the issues were raised by individual litigants, who grounded their
claims in individual assertions that Congress was interfering with their right to
have an Article III judge adjudicate their dispute.248
With increasing alacrity, the Roberts Court has also decided cases involving
claims that Congress has infringed on the discretion or power of the executive
branch or that the executive branch has infringed upon an authority of
Congress. The Court has entertained claims that a decision maker in a coercive
proceeding was not appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments
Clause.249 Relatedly, the Court has also heard challenges to congressional
restriction on the President’s removal power.250 As Zivotofsky II251 itself reflects,
the Court has entertained claims that Congress has interfered with executive
authority over foreign affairs.252 The Court has heard challenges that the
President has acted in derogation of, or without, adequate legislative
authority.253 Finally, the Court has fielded challenges to the President’s use of
recess appointments.254 In each of these cases, the Roberts Court has relied on
individual litigants to bring the claims within its purview.
Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission255 reflects the lengths to which the
Court has gone to ensure that separation-of-powers claims come to the federal
246. See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 902–03 (2018) (upholding provision of Gun Lake Trust
Land Reaffirmation Act that directed the Court to dismiss pending action); Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 578
U.S. 212, 215–16, 231–32 (2016) (upholding congressional authority to amend law that applies to pending
cases, even when it is outcome determinative, so long as Congress does not say, in Smith v. Jones, “Smith
wins”).
247. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that provision of Military
Commission Act barring federal court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus actions of Guantanamo detainees
violated Suspension Clause).
248. See cases cited supra notes 245–247.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Arthrex, 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1982 (2021) (holding that appointment
mechanism for administrative patent judges in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board violates the Appointments
Clause); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1655 (2020) (holding
that members of board authorized to file bankruptcy proceedings on behalf of Puerto Rico were not “Officers
of the United States”); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049 (2018) (holding that SEC Administrative Law
Judges are “inferior officers” within the meaning of the Appointments Clause). Professor Gillian Metzger
has noted that, under the Roberts Court, “[t]he federal appointments process is having its proverbial day in
the sun.” Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, Innovation, and the Judicial–Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1608
(2015).
250. See, e.g., Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (striking down
restrictions on removal of CFPB director); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
492 (2010) (holding that Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s dual for-cause restrictions on removal of members of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violate the Constitution).
251. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015).
252. See id. at 13–14 (holding that the President exercises exclusive power of recognition).
253. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008) (holding that the President lacks power
to convert a non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing one absent authority from Congress).
254. See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 550 (2014) (invalidating the President’s appointments
during pro forma sessions as inconsistent with the Recess Appointments Clause).
255. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
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courts.256 After agreeing with Raymond Lucia that the Administrative Law
Judge who presided over his hearing on securities violations was an inferior
officer whose appointment violated the Appointments Clause,257 the Lucia
Court clarified what appropriate relief might look like. Recognizing the ease
with which the underlying defect in a particular Administrative Law Judge’s
appointment could be cured and the fact that the properly appointed
Administrative Law Judge would almost certainly render the same decision, the
Court held that Lucia needed a new hearing before a different Administrative
Law Judge.258 In so doing, the Court forthrightly admitted both its goal of
creating “incentives” to raise Appointments Clause challenges and the fact that
the defect had had no impact whatsoever on Lucia’s initial hearing.259 The next
Part will criticize this reliance; for present purposes, the important point is
descriptive, not normative: the Court has had to engage in some contortion in
order to slake its appetite for cases, even going so far as to incentivize litigants
it could not otherwise count on to care.
II. THE MYRIAD PROBLEMS OF RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON INDIVIDUAL
LITIGANTS
The Roberts Court has embraced the role of federal courts as boundary
cops, disdaining the approach taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist, without
reexamining the role of institutional players. This approach would make good
sense if the Court could defensibly rely exclusively on individual litigants.
However, reliance on individual litigants as opposed to institutional actors to
bring separation-of-powers claims into the federal courts occasionally gives rise
to doctrinal incoherence. This Part flags several ways in which the Court is
doing something in this separation-of-powers context that is hard to square
with what it has said in others.
A. Individuals Frequently Lack Litigable Interests260 in the Structural Constitution
Reliance on individual litigants to raise separation-of-powers violations is
often problematic because their claims of individual harm due to the separation256. In Ryder v. United States, the Court had allowed that individual litigants making timely
separation-of-powers challenges are entitled to a judgment on the merits and “whatever relief may be
appropriate,” as “[a]ny other rule would create a disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges.” 515
U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995).
257. See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2053–54.
258. Id. at 2055.
259. Id. at n.5.
260. Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson introduced this term. See Woolhandler & Nelson, supra note
60, at 709, 717–19. James Pfander described “litigable interest” as the “requir[ement] that plaintiffs who wish
to invoke the judicial power set up a claim of right (an ‘interest’) in accordance with the forms prescribed by
law (‘litigable’).” See Pfander, supra note 60, at 224. Commentators have also lamented the Court’s frequent
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of-powers violations they assert are difficult to justify. Here, it is important to
distinguish claims of entitlement to an Article III decision maker from other
separation-of-powers claims, like the claim to a validly appointed regulatory
enforcement body. In the former situation, the individual’s interest has a
longstanding pedigree; in the latter, it does not.
Where Congress encroaches on the power of the federal judiciary in
violation of Article III, individuals subject to non-Article III decision makers
have a straightforward claim to legally cognizable harm.261 Litigants maintaining
that they are entitled to Article III adjudication of their claims raise a
particularized claim about the identity of the decision maker in their case
because the special features of Article III judges—the salary protection and life
tenure guaranteed by Article III—are vital to the substantive legitimacy of the
outcome and have consistently been described in individual-protective terms.262
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton argued that the independence of the
federal judiciary was an “essential safeguard” to protect individuals against
judges “unwilling[] to hazard the displeasure” of the political branches.263 Cases
have repeatedly reflected this core value. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v.
Sharif264 stated outright that “[t]he entitlement to an Article III adjudicator is ‘a
confusion of the question whether a plaintiff has standing with the question whether a plaintiff has a right of
action. See Henry Paul Monaghan, A Cause of Action, Anyone?: Federal Equity and the Preemption of State Law, 91
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1807, 1817 (2016); Nelson, supra note 63, at 777–83. For my purposes, “litigable
interest” is a useful proxy for injury-in-fact because many individual assertions of separation-of-powers claims
arise as defenses to enforcement proceedings rather than as initial actions where the individuals are party
plaintiffs. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2205 (2020). As others have
noted, the terms “standing” and “cause of action” are very much related in this context and are frequently
used interchangeably. See Ann Woolhandler, Governmental Sovereignty Actions, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 209,
211 (2014); Huq, supra note 31, at 1515 n.321. The concepts are obviously interrelated; a defendant who
unsuccessfully asserts a separation-of-powers claim in defense will need to establish the requisites of standing
in order to appeal. See Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (“To ensure a case remains ‘fit for
federal-court adjudication,’ the parties must have the necessary stake not only at the outset of litigation, but
throughout its course.”). Where an individual lacks a legally protectable interest, she suffers no harm from an
adverse judgment and should lack Article III standing to pursue that appeal. See discussion supra Part I.B.
261. The federal judiciary is also singularly ill-suited for self-help. See Huq, supra note 31, at 1443–44
(“[T]he only constitutionally salient institution that lacks the capacity to lodge objections in court on structural
constitutional grounds is the Article III judiciary itself.”); Pozen, supra note 5, at 21–22 (“[J]udicial self-help
plays only a modest role in our constitutional system.”). As Huq noted, “[j]udges, simply stated, do not often
sue.” Huq, supra note 31, at 1521. But cf. Beer v. United States, 696 F.3d 1174, 1177–78, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(invalidating acts of Congress that diminished federal judicial compensation as violative of Article III’s
Compensation Clause in class action filed by federal judges).
262. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 483–84 (2011) (explaining that the special features of Article
III judges serve to “protect liberty” and to “preserve the integrity of judicial decisionmaking”).
263. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Chief
Justice Marshall, addressing the Virginia Convention, stated,
The Judicial Department comes home in its effects to every man’s fireside: it passes on his
property, his reputation, his life, his all. Is it not, to the last degree important, that [the judge]
should be rendered perfectly and completely independent, with nothing to influence or controul
him but God and his conscience?
PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 616 (1830); see also
O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 532 (1933) (quoting Marshall).
264. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665 (2015).
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personal right.’”265 In Stern v. Marshall, Pierce Marshall objected to adjudication
of a tortious interference counterclaim in non-Article III bankruptcy
proceedings.266 The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, agreed, finding that
structural protections inherent in the separation of powers “protect the
individual” as well as each respective branch.267 The Court explained that the
federal courts’ insulation from the political process was designed “to ensure
that each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward currying
favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the ‘[c]lear heads . . . and
honest hearts’ deemed ‘essential to good judges.’”268 The key features
differentiating Article III judges from non-Article III judges are indispensable
to a fair, impartial determination of the litigant’s own claim, and common sense
and tradition both buttress the idea that the individual litigant suffers an
individualized injury by its threatened deprivation that is redressable by a
decision in his favor.269
Reliance on individual litigants is more problematic in other separation-ofpowers cases, where individuals’ claims of right, and claims to harm, can be
more attenuated.270 Where the individual’s claim is that a regulatory body is
acting against her in a way that the Constitution does not permit, the claim of harm
is straightforward and the individual has a privilege against the regulatory action
in question.271 But the claimed separation-of-powers violation in cases
265. Id. at 678; see also Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929 n.6 (1991) (noting the importance of
the “personal right to an Article III adjudicator”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 848 (1986) (characterizing “Article III’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication”
as “a personal right”); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962) (finding that requirement of an
Article III adjudicator “relates to basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants”).
266. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 471–72.
267. Id. at 483.
268. Id. at 484 (quoting 1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (J. Andrews ed. 1896)).
269. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Legislative Courts, Legislative Power, and the Constitution, 65 IND. L.J. 291, 302
(1990) (“Article III protects the rights of litigants precisely through its creation of judicial
independence . . . .”). The same pattern holds in the judicial finality context. For example, in Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995), defendant Spendthrift Farm had prevailed when the plaintiff’s securities action
was dismissed as time-barred. See id. at 214. Plaintiff opted not to appeal, and the judgment became final. See
id. The act of Congress purporting to reopen plaintiff’s suit impermissibly interfered with the finality of this
decision and brought Spendthrift Farm back into the crosshairs. See id. at 225–26. To the extent that final
resolution by an Article III decision maker is an individual right, Spendthrift Farm suffered individualized,
concrete harm when it could not rely on the finality of a decision by the apolitical judicial branch.
270. See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 312 (1984) (“Even if the
litigant has ‘standing’ to raise these claims because his ‘interests’ are implicated, many of these structural
challenges have been thought by some commentators not to involve the litigant’s ‘rights’ in any
straightforward sense.”). To be sure, the framers described the Constitution’s commitment to enumerated
powers as protective of individual rights. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (describing “the Constitution . . . itself, in every rational sense, and to every . . . purpose”
as a Bill of Rights); Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PENN. L. REV. 1513, 1516
(1991) (arguing that the Constitution’s separation of powers scheme protects individual rights against
tyrannical majorities). However, the structural Constitution protects individual rights writ large, not the rights
of any particular individual. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III.
271. See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 423 (1998) (finding President’s
unconstitutional line-item veto canceled a specific spending item that would have benefited plaintiff); INS v.
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challenging incursions on the executive and legislative branches frequently has
no such obvious or pedigreed link to a personal interest, and it is widely
understood that litigants asserting many claims as defenses in coercive
nonjudicial proceedings cannot show, indeed do not even attempt to show, that
the claimed defect actually tainted the proceeding’s substantive outcome.272
Outside of the Article III context, for example, the right to a properly
appointed regulatory actor or decision maker has not historically been seen as
an entrenched personal freedom. The traditional method of challenging an
officeholder’s appointment was through a statutory quo warranto action, an
action undertaken by the state or a designated representative in which the
validity of an officeholder’s title was the only issue.273 Courts employed the de
facto officer doctrine to exempt defects in title and appointment from collateral
attack by people displeased with their actions “[f]or over five hundred years.”274
In 1886, the Court, basing the doctrine on “policy and necessity,” indicated that
“[o]ffices are created for the benefit of the public,” and stated that “endless
confusion” would result if private parties were permitted in every proceeding
to call their title into question.275

Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 926–28 (1983) (holding Congress’s unconstitutional legislative veto revoked the
Attorney General’s decision to allow an immigrant to remain in the United States). In that case, the individual
has a privilege against punishment or sanction for her conduct, and the injury to the individual is more readily
cast in terms of individual harm. See id. at 935–36 (finding the plaintiff had demonstrated an injury in fact).
272. The Lucia Court forthrightly admitted that the Administrative Law Judge, once properly
appointed, “could be expected to reach all the same judgments.” Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.5
(2018). Most recently, the Court acknowledged in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Finance Protection Bureau, “[w]e
have held that a litigant challenging governmental action as void on the basis of the separation of powers is
not required to prove that the Government’s course of conduct would have been different in a ‘counterfactual
world’ in which the Government had acted with constitutional authority.” 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020).
273. See Kathryn A. Clokey, Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine: The Case for Continued Application, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1121, 1124 (1985). A quo warranto action against a wrongly-appointed federal officer
traditionally was initiated by the U.S. Attorney General or a rival claimant, proceeding by leave of the court.
See id. The D.C. Circuit criticized the quo warranto mechanism as “an extremely difficult and uncertain remedy”
in Andrade v. Lauer. 729 F.2d 1475, 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81 replaces the
traditional quo warranto writ with complaint and motion practice. FED. R. CIV. P. 81.
274. Note, The De Facto Officer Doctrine, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 909, 909 (1963) [hereinafter Columbia Note];
see also Clokey, supra note 273, at 1125 (recounting origin of doctrine as early as 1431). The Supreme Court
even relied on the doctrine to reject collateral claims by incarcerated inmates that their Article III judges had
technical defects in their appointments. See, e.g., Ex parte Ward, 173 U.S. 452, 454 (1899) (characterizing the
de facto officer doctrine as a “well-settled rule” that precluded a habeas petitioner’s challenge to the
appointment of the federal judge presiding over his trial); McDowell v. United States, 159 U.S. 596, 601–02
(1895) (“[T]he rule is well settled that where there is an office to be filled, and one, acting under color of
authority, fills the office and discharges its duties, his actions are those of an officer de facto, and binding upon
the public.”(emphasis added)). In Nguyen v. United States, however, the Court characterized these as merely
technical defects and affirmed that deprivation of an Article III judge is different. See 539 U.S. 69, 77–80
(2003). The Nguyen Court declined to invoke the de facto officer doctrine when a Ninth Circuit panel
reviewing an appeal from the District Court of Guam concededly included a non-Article III judge, again
underscoring the importance of an Article III decision maker to the legitimacy of the underlying result. See
id. at 77.
275. Norton v. Shelby Cnty., 118 U.S. 425, 441–42 (1886); see also 1 Albert Constantineau, A TREATISE
ON THE DE FACTO DOCTRINE 6 (1910) (indicating that permitting individuals to challenge the authority of

BESKE_LITIGATING THE SEPARATION OF POWERS_EIC REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

Litigating the Separation of Powers

4/21/2022 10:47 AM

859

Admittedly, the Supreme Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, declined to
invoke the de facto officer doctrine in Ryder v. United States and accorded a courtmartial defendant a new hearing before a properly constituted military appellate
tribunal in 1995.276 In doing so, the Court was likely influenced by the nature
of the proceedings; while military courts have always operated outside the
purview of Article III,277 Professor Stephen I. Vladeck has noted that “the U.S.
military justice system has increasingly come to resemble ordinary civilian
courts in recent years, at least in criminal cases.”278 So, too, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s disaffection with institutional standing may have played a role; the
Ryder Court openly admitted its concern was with incentivizing litigants to raise
such claims (as the Roberts Court later did in Lucia).279 The Court did not
suggest that its reasoning was grounded in due process or systemic legitimacy,
and it left prior cases that had relied on the de facto officer doctrine in the
Appointments Clause context intact.280 The point here is not to debate the de
facto officer doctrine but to state, more modestly, that if Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins281
and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez282 instruct us to look to historical practice as a
guide in recognizing the concreteness of claims, finding an individual litigable
interest in many separation-of-powers cases runs into the distinct problem that
until quite recently, the actions of defectively appointed non-Article III entities
who exercised de facto authority were unassailable at law.
While these litigants conceivably could frame their litigable interest as a
right to a validly constituted regulatory body, that argument is not particularly
persuasive. It is a second cousin of the “valid rule” requirement, famously
described by Professor Henry Paul Monaghan.283 Per Monaghan, the rule of
law, grounded in due process, requires “that the Constitution forbid[] the
imposition of sanctions except in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule,
officers on the basis of defective titles would encourage “insubordination and disorder of the worst kind”
that “might at any time culminate in anarchy”).
276. 515 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1995).
277. See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 935 (2015).
278. Id. at 941 (footnote omitted). Ryder came eight years after Solorio v. United States, a case Vladeck
terms “the most significant U.S. military justice development of the past half-century.” Id. at 962. Solorio held
that a member of the armed forces could be tried by court martial even for offenses that were not connected
to service. See Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987). By 1995, then, criminal justice in military courts
was looking more like regular justice, and the Ryder Court thus may have seen petitioner’s injury in individual
terms and found an implicit analogy to the Article III cases.
279. See Ryder, 515 U.S. at 183 (“Any other rule would create a disincentive to raise Appointments
Clause challenges with respect to questionable judicial appointments.”).
280. See id. at 184. In the 2019 term, the Supreme Court took up the de facto officer doctrine in
Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto Rico. v. Aurelius Investment, LLC but ultimately sidestepped the
question by concluding that there was no underlying Appointments Clause violation. See 140 S. Ct. 1649,
1665 (2020).
281. 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016); see also supra notes 86–100 and accompanying text.
282. 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204 (2021).
283. See Monaghan, supra note 270, at 285; Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1,
3 (“Under ‘conventional’ standing principles, a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance
with a constitutionally valid rule of law.”).
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whether or not the defendant’s conduct is itself constitutionally privileged.”284
The argument would have to be that no one can be sanctioned for violating a
perfectly constitutional statute by someone who appears to be, but actually is
not, constitutionally entitled to say so. It wrenches Monaghan’s formulation out
of context to apply this principle not to the substantive rule by which a litigant
is judged, but to a defect in the appointment of the decision maker. This
“defective messenger” argument seems less obviously to offend the rule of law;
after all, the claimant has by all accounts violated the rule, and the rule by all
accounts validly proscribes the claimant’s conduct. The difference between the
regulatory arrangement claimants seek and the regulatory arrangement
claimants were provided lacks implications for the legitimacy or outcome of the
substantive result.285 Our system has never aspired to such perfection,
particularly given age-old reliance on the de facto officer doctrine, and Huq has
criticized invocation of the valid rule doctrine in this context as a “post hoc
classification of outcomes.”286
Individuals might alternatively press these claims without showing
individual injury if we can classify them as “structural errors” requiring
automatic reversal even in the absence of demonstrable harm.287 But this
approach, too, is hard to justify. In Landry v. FDIC,288 the D.C. Circuit wrestled
with the absence of provable harm in an Appointments Clause case and
concluded that such challenges, termed “structural” at times by the Supreme
Court,289 might in fact represent structural errors.290 The Landry court took the
Supreme Court’s use of the term structural to describe the nature of the claim,

284. Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, endorsed this principle in her concurrence in Bond v. United States.
564 U.S. 211, 226 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Professor Richard Fallon has argued that the valid rule
principle is “fundamental” and that its “roots lie in the history and structure of the Constitution and in the
deeper values that the Constitution serves.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and ThirdParty Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2000).
285. See Huq, supra note 31, at 1451.
286. See id. at 1454. We accept harmless error doctrine to overlook nonstructural constitutional defects
in criminal trials; our tolerance for imperfection in that context certainly suggests aspiration to perfection in
the less weighty administrative context may be questionable. See Monaghan, supra note 284, at 200 (observing,
in criminal context, that “the Court’s animating principle is that error free proceedings cannot be an
inexorable demand”).
287. See, e.g., Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (2017) (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). The term structural error has its origins in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309–10 (1991).
In the portion of his opinion that was for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist differentiated “trial error[s],”
which are subject to harmless error analysis, from “structural defects in the constitution of the trial
mechanism,” like deprivation of the right to counsel, a biased judge, and exclusion of black jurors from the
grand jury pool. Id.
288. 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
289. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 (1995) (describing doctrine of
separation of powers as a “structural safeguard”).
290. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131; see also Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796
F.3d 111, 123 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Landry for the proposition that “an Appointments Clause violation is a
structural error that warrants reversal regardless of whether prejudice can be shown”).
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arising as it does as an inference from the Constitution’s structure, and
borrowed it to explain the absence of any traditionally understood injury or
individual interest. The key to the Landry court’s analysis was that litigants in
these kinds of cases might never be able to demonstrate harm, and there is a
built-in circularity to the court’s conclusion.291 The Supreme Court itself has
never found structural error in the civil context.292 Certainly, calling these kinds
of errors structural would be a marriage of convenience that would allow the
Court to dodge the absence of real injury. On the other hand, these claims do
not fit naturally or logically with other structural errors like total deprivation of
counsel in a criminal case,293 systematic exclusion of people of a certain race
from petit294 or grand juries,295 or a biased trial judge,296 all of which present
questions of “grave constitutional trespass”297 that “seriously affect[] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation” of criminal proceedings.298 Again, the
five hundred years during which the de facto officer doctrine routinely
permitted courts to overlook defects in the appointment or title of officeholders
and insulate them from collateral attack tend to undercut the argument that
these kinds of defects represent structural error, at least as we have previously
understood the term.299
The first difficulty with relying on individuals to raise separation-of-powers
challenges, then, is that only sometimes do they have what we have traditionally
recognized as a litigable personal right. The special features of an Article III
judge have long been conceptualized as protective of the individual and give
rise to litigable rights and interests, while the harm suffered by individuals
subject to defectively appointed regulatory decision makers traditionally has
not. Efforts to analogize to the valid rule concept or to label these errors
structural and vindicable absent any showing of harm require great leaps. The
Court has assumed litigants’ ability to raise separation-of-powers claims in a
defensive posture but has spent little effort to explain why this is so. If concrete

291. See Landry, 204 F.3d at 1131. In Weaver v. Massachusetts, the Court did say that it occasionally finds
structural error when “the effects of the error are simply too hard to measure.” 137 S. Ct. at 1908. The Court
cited for this principal Vasquez v. Hillery, in which the Court found structural error in the systematic exclusion
of prospective grand jurors of defendant’s race from the grand jury pool because such errors struck at
“fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as a whole” and constituted “grave constitutional
trespass.” 474 U.S. 254, 262 (1986). Given the Vasquez citation, it is difficult to read Weaver for the proposition
that the mere immeasurability of impact of any error makes it structural.
292. See Al Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 660 F.3d 1019, 1041 (9th Cir.
2011).
293. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963).
294. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
295. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 260–64.
296. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927).
297. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 262.
298. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
736 (1993)).
299. See Columbia Note, supra note 274, at 909.
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individual interests are a function of history or common sense, as Spokeo and
TransUnion instruct, the Court’s practice of relying on individuals to raise these
claims is difficult to square with existing jurisprudence.
B. The Court’s (Sub Silentio) Creation of a Private Attorney General Mechanism Is
Inconsistent with Case Law
The Supreme Court’s efforts to generate incentives for these litigants, too,
are problematic and out of step with what the Court has said in other contexts.
In Ryder v. United States,300 the Court allowed that individual litigants making
timely separation-of-powers challenges are entitled to a judgment on the merits
and “whatever relief may be appropriate,” as “[a]ny other rule would create a
disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges.”301 The Lucia Court,
recognizing the ease with which the underlying defect in a particular
Administrative Law Judge’s appointment could be cured and the fact that the
properly appointed Administrative Law Judge would almost certainly render the
same decision, afforded Lucia a new hearing before a different Administrative
Law Judge.302 The Lucia Court did not mention the valid rule doctrine, harmless
error, structural error, or standing in its analysis. Lucia evinces the Court’s desire
to provide a lane for certain separation-of-powers challenges and reflects a
Court that is not terribly concerned about how or why it is, exactly, that
individual litigants like Ryder and Lucia are well-situated to bring them.303
Thirty-five years ago, Professor Monaghan likened the empowerment of
individuals to assert separation-of-powers claims to recognition of a private
attorney general,304 and Lucia aptly demonstrates his point. The Court has
conferred a possible bounty—a second bite at regulatory proceedings for the
disappointed litigant—on individual claimants in an effort to drum up lawsuits
that primarily serve other, more institutional interests. Monaghan
acknowledged that Congress could create and confer such bounties under its
Article I powers but questioned, “[W]hat is the source of judicial authority to
license such suits on the Court’s own motion?”305 Monaghan speculated that
300. 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
301. Id. at 182–83.
302. Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018). Before Lucia, Professor Kent Barnett argued that the
Court’s remedies for individual litigants raising structural challenges were “inconsequential,” leaving the
prevailing litigant “incurr[ing] significant costs only to end up where it began.” Kent Barnett, To the Victor
Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 485 (2014). I
do not take issue with that contention; I take issue with the idea that these litigants had injuries that required
remedy in the first place.
303. Most recently, in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court, per
Chief Justice Roberts, relied exclusively on past practice to permit litigants to challenge the constitutionality
of an officer’s removal restriction. See 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020). Again, the Court did not engage the
question why this is so.
304. See Monaghan, supra note 270, at 313.
305. Id. at 313–14.
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the Court might be creating constitutional common law.306 Perhaps so. But
indulging in constitutional common law to create remedies in this area is
difficult to square with the Court’s modern reticence to imply constitutional
remedies in other contexts.307 The Court has clearly communicated that implied
constitutional remedies under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics,308 for example, are a relic of an “ancien regime” whose
expansion is now a “‘disfavored’ judicial activity.”309 This retreat from the
implication of remedies not prescribed by Congress is grounded in a conception
of the judicial power.310 The Court has repeatedly forsworn the creation of
remedies to effectuate its own “policy” preferences,311 and its unexamined
willingness to “have one last drink”312—or more—in this context is remarkable.
It is also difficult to square with prior statements the Court has made about
the judicial power to create private attorney general mechanisms, specifically.313
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,314 the Court held that federal
courts cannot, absent legislative authority, provide attorneys’ fees to victorious
private attorneys general, for fear that they will end up giving effect to their own
“substantive-law preferences and priorities.”315 Certainly, there is a distinction
between the provision of attorneys’ fees and the requirement that a prevailing
litigant get a new hearing before a different decision maker. However, the
problem in Alyeska Pipeline was the Court substituting its own will to prefer
some litigants and claims over others, and this is how commentators have
understood it. Professor Judith Resnik read in Alyeska Pipeline the proposition
that “the Supreme Court forbade judges from selecting litigants to reward for
entering courts in pursuit of public norm enforcement.”316 Professor Owen Fiss
noted “the Court’s insistence in Alyeska Pipeline that any expansion of the

306. See id. at 314–15.
307. Implied constitutional remedies peaked within a few years of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and have been in retreat ever since. See, e.g., Ziglar v. Abbasi,
137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017) (stating that the modern Court looks for statutory “‘intent’ to create ‘a private
remedy’” and without that, “courts may not create one” (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–
87 (2001))).
308. 403 U.S. 388.
309. Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1855–57.
310. See Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286–87 (stating that without statutory intent to create a private remedy,
“a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one”).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Indeed, Monaghan observed in 2016 that the Roberts Court “seems completely inhospitable to
any freestanding notion of the private attorney general.” Monaghan, supra note 260, at 1815 n.57.
314. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
315. Id. at 263–64 & n.39.
316. Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 2139 (2000).
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concept of the private attorney general would require specific statutory
authorization.”317
The Court’s effort to incentivize these litigants by creating a bounty is
questionable absent statutory authority. At the same time that other implied
constitutional remedies are on the wane, the Court has taken a uniquely active
stance in this context, reaching out to ensure itself a steady diet of a particular,
favored claim.
C. Individuals Will Be Challenged to Present Certain Separation-of-Powers Claims
In addition to its tension with conventional notions of the judicial power,
reliance on individuals to raise separation-of-powers claims also can give rise to
substantive gaps. Not every unconstitutionally appointed officer, for example,
acts in a manner that subjects individuals to enforcement proceedings or
coercive action. In these cases, no individual litigants can come forward, and
barring institutional actors from court may mean the courts have no mechanism
for policing interbranch boundaries at all.
Take, for instance, the unsuccessful challenges to the composition of the
Federal Reserve System’s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The
FOMC controls the nation’s money supply and is arguably “the country’s most
important agency.”318 Blessed both with “extraordinary independence and
relative opacity,”319 the FOMC uses the purchase and sales of government
securities in the open market as a tool to control the nation’s interest rates.320
The FOMC’s decisions and actions in the market have a significant effect on
the U.S. economy.321 Per the statute, the FOMC is comprised of the seven
members of the Board of Governors, all nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate for fourteen-year terms, the President of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, and four other regional presidents on a rotating
basis.322 Regional presidents are appointed by a board of directors selected by
private banks and the Board of Governors.323 At any given time, therefore, five
317. Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1074 n.9 (1984); see also Robert
L. Rabin, Lawyers for Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 259 (1976) (stating,
after Alyeska Pipeline, that judicial creation of a private attorney general remedy would “invade the province
of Congress”).
318. David Zaring, Law and Custom on the Federal Open Market Committee, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
157, 157 (2015).
319. Id. at 159.
320. See generally Federal Open Market Committee, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS. (Jan. 26,
2022), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm (describing role of FOMC in setting
monetary policy).
321. See Ben S. Bernanke & Alan S. Blinder, The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary
Transmission, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 901, 903 (1992) (concluding that monetary policy has a measurable effect
on the real economy).
322. See 12 U.S.C. § 263.
323. See id. § 304.
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voting members of the FOMC have not been appointed by the President or a
Head of Department. Whether this arrangement actually violates the
Appointments Clause is beyond the scope of this Article; however, the claim
that the regional President members of the FOMC exercise “significant
authority” sufficient to put them into the “Officer,” rather than “lesser
functionary,” category is certainly credible after Lucia v. SEC324 and United States
v. Arthrex.325
In Committee for Monetary Reform v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System,326 the D.C. Circuit fielded a challenge to the composition of the FOMC
by a nonprofit organization and 800 other corporations, businesses, and
individuals claiming harm due to “devastatingly high interest rates” caused by
FOMC policies.327 The unanimous panel denied standing. Accepting that high
interest rates caused measurable injury, the court found the challenged FOMC
members’ influence on any particular policy and the impact of any particular
policy on the claimed adverse conditions to be too speculative to support
causation.328 The court rejected the litigants’ effort to analogize their role to that
of the litigants in Buckley v. Valeo,329 reasoning that “[b]y contrast to the litigants
in Buckley, the appellants here do not allege they are directly subject to the
governmental authority they seek to challenge, but merely assert that they are
substantially affected by the exercise of that authority.”330 The court concluded
that, to permit a challenge by anyone “indirectly affected” by a policy would
require courts to field “‘generalized grievance[s]’ shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens.”331 The court thus held that “litigants
have standing to challenge the authority of an agency on separation-of-powers
grounds only where they are directly subject to the authority of the agency,
whether such authority is regulatory, administrative, or adjudicative in
nature.”332 The composition of an entity charged with policymaking authority
that affects vast sectors of the American economy thus eluded challenge by
individual actors—even in the face of a credible Appointments Clause claim—

324. See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2051 (2018) (employing but declining to elaborate upon the
concise significant authority test set out in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)).
325. 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1981 (2021). In Arthrex, the Court held that Administrative Patent Judges were
officers, not lesser functionaries, because they could invalidate previously issued patents. See id. at 1980.
Because these judges exercised such significant authority, the Court required that they be directly supervised
by a Principal Officer appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. See id. at 1982.
The FOMC, of course, wields far more significant power and enjoys no such supervision.
326. 766 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
327. Id. at 540–41.
328. See id. at 542.
329. 424 U.S. 1.
330. Comm. for Monetary Reform, 766 F.2d at 543.
331. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
332. Id.
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because individuals were not provably hurt by the defect and the body did not
directly subject any individuals to its authority.333
These are not the only separation-of-powers claims that may be difficult
for individuals to bring. A shutdown of legislative standing and exclusive
reliance on individual litigants may make it difficult for courts to field
Emoluments Clause challenges, as well. The Foreign Emoluments Clause of
the Constitution prohibits U.S. officeholders from “accept[ing] . . . any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or
foreign State” without “the Consent of the Congress.”334 The Supreme Court
has not elaborated on the meaning of the Clause.335 Designed to avert
corruption, the Clause is an effort to prevent officeholders from being “seduced
by baubles and titles to put favor toward other countries before patriotism.”336
Corruption, a “‘crucial term’ for the American Framers,” was “discussed more
often in the Constitutional Convention than factions, violence, or instability.”337
The Clause gives Congress a textually committed role in preclearing any foreign
gift “of any kind whatever,” in the absence of which its receipt is presumably
prohibited.338
After the inauguration of President Donald Trump, litigants brought three
lawsuits challenging his ownership of and participation in an extensive business
empire that includes the Trump Tower in New York and the Trump
International Hotel in Washington, D.C.339 These lawsuits each took a different
tack in attempting to satisfy the requisites of standing doctrine, with the first
filed by a consumer watchdog group and individual litigants alleging increased

333. This is but one example. Professor Jamal Greene notes that one problem with reliance on
individual plaintiffs is “the difficulty in reaching a court of any kind in the first instance.” Greene, supra note
20, at 135. He cites, for example, the many questionable recess appointments made during intrasession
recesses to fill positions like Engraver of the Mint, or Deputy Postmaster, or member of the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting, none of which subject individuals to coercive proceedings and all of which would elude
individual challenge under the D.C. Circuit’s formulation. See id.
334. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 8.
335. A search of “Emoluments Clause” on Westlaw on May 21, 2021, reflected fifty-nine reported
cases, the vast majority of which issued after January 2017. In United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, which
rejected a serviceman’s claim that the order that he wear a United Nations shoulder patch and headgear while
he served on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Macedonia required him to accept a foreign emolument, the
court noted that “[p]etitioner has offered (and there appears to be) no Supreme Court precedent defining the
scope and application of the clause.” 350 F. Supp. 2d 80, 102 (D.D.C. 2004).
336. Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 362 (2009). But see Seth
Barrett Tillman, Citizens United and the Scope of Professor Teachout’s Anti-Corruption Principle, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
399, 405–06 (2012) (arguing that the Constitution’s relaxation of the Articles of Confederation’s prohibitions
on state officers accepting foreign gifts signified the Framers were not “obsessed” by the potential for foreign
corruption).
337. Teachout, supra note 336, at 352–53.
338. See Zephyr Teachout, Gifts, Offices, and Corruption, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 30, 33 (2012) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art I., § 9, cl. 8).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 340–346.
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monitoring costs and competitive injury (Competitor/Watchdog Complaint),340
the second filed by the state of Maryland and the District of Columbia alleging
injury to sovereign and proprietary interests (State Complaint),341 and the third
filed by 215 members of Congress alleging institutional injury (Congressional
Complaint).342 Reasonable minds can disagree on the standing questions, and
each case took a serpentine path. The Second Circuit reversed a decision of the
district court denying standing343 in the Competitor/Watchdog Complaint344
and subsequently denied a petition for rehearing en banc. A Fourth Circuit
panel initially granted a petition for mandamus and reversed the district court
decision345 finding standing in the State Complaint,346 but the en banc court
reversed the panel decision, finding an insufficiently “clear and indisputable”
basis to invoke the “drastic” remedy of mandamus.347 The Supreme Court
granted both petitions for certiorari and remanded with instructions to dismiss
as moot after President Biden’s inauguration.348 Finally, the D.C. Circuit
reversed a district court decision granting standing in the Congressional
Complaint, relying entirely on Raines v. Byrd.349 The Supreme Court denied the
petition for certiorari on October 13, 2020.350
Whether individual and state plaintiffs proceeding on a competitorstanding theory can bring Emoluments challenges is difficult to predict, and
circumstance afforded no definitive call. However, there may be reasons for
skepticism, as even those supportive of competitor standing in this context call

340. See Second Amended Complaint, Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F.
Supp. 3d 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-cv-00458-RA) [hereinafter Competitor/Watchdog Complaint].
341. See Complaint, District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725 (D. Md. 2018) (No. 17-cv01596-PJM), 2017 WL 2559732 [hereinafter State Complaint].
342. See Complaint, Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-cv-01154), 2017
WL 2561946 [hereinafter Congressional Complaint]. The increased phenomenon of state litigants suing to
enforce federal law has been a singular feature of the Obama and Trump eras. See generally Seth Davis, The
New Public Standing, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1229, 1233–34 (2019) (cataloging “spate” of recent public interest suits
by states); Tara Leigh Grove, Forward: Some Puzzles of State Standing, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1883, 1884–85
(2019) (noting sharp uptick in state suits against the federal executive under Obama and Trump
administrations).
343. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 184–87, 188–89
(S.D.N.Y. 2017), vacated, 953 F.3d 178 (2d. Cir. 2019).
344. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics, 953 F.3d at 190–94 (reversing district court and finding that
allegations of competitors plausibly alleged injury in fact, causation, and redressability).
345. See District of Columbia v. Trump, 291 F. Supp. 3d 725, 752–53 (D. Md. 2018), vacated as moot,
838 F. App’x 789 (4th Cir. 2021).
346. See In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360, 375–77 (4th Cir. 2019).
347. See In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 281, 286–87 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
348.
See Order List, Supreme Court Summary Dispositions, 592 U.S. (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/012521zor_3f14.pdf.
349. See Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 18–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The congressional plaintiffs did
not file a petition for rehearing en banc but filed a petition for certiorari on July 6, 2020. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Blumenthal, 949 F.3d 14 (No. SC20-5-07102020), 2020 WL 3904651.
350.
See Order List, Supreme Court Summary Dispositions, 592 U.S. (Oct. 13, 2020),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/101320zor_8m58.pdf.
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it “a complicated and close question.”351 Competitors may face an uphill climb
in establishing that they are within a class of plaintiffs whose interests the
Emoluments Clause protects. In Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc.,352 the Court clarified that “zone of interests” is not a standing
concept but a conventional inquiry that—in the statutory context, at least—
“requires us to determine, using traditional tools of statutory interpretation,
whether a legislatively conferred cause of action encompasses a particular
plaintiff’s claim.”353 In Alexander v. Sandoval,354 the Court put a tight rein on this
inquiry, instructing that judges are not to find litigable rights absent clear intent
from Congress and “may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be
as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”355 Ziglar v. Abbasi
suggests this same inquiry may be relevant in inferring rights of action under
the Constitution.356 It is plausible that the confluence of Lexmark, Sandoval, and
Ziglar will lead the Court to deploy an original understanding of the
anticorruption purposes of the Foreign Emoluments Clause to preclude
individual competitors from filing suit, at least absent a statute expressly
conferring a right of action.357 If institutional actors cannot step into the breach,
the Emoluments Clause may be the proverbial parchment barrier.
III. REVISITING RAINES: THE CASE FOR LIMITED INSTITUTIONAL
STANDING UNDER EXISTING PRECEDENT
The role of individuals in vindicating most separation-of-powers values is
often problematic, and the Court’s limited conception of institutional standing,

351. See Jed Handelsman Shugerman & Gautham Rao, Emoluments, Zones of Interests, and Political
Questions: A Cautionary Tale, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 651, 651 (2018).
352. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).
353. Id. at 127; see also S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 95,
112 (2014); Woolhandler, supra note 260, at 212.
354. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
355. Id. at 286–87.
356. See 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1856–57 (2017).
357. The district court initially rejected the Competitor/Watchdog Complaint on this ground. See
Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 276 F. Supp. 3d 174, 187–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (“There
is simply no basis to conclude that the Hospitality Plaintiffs’ alleged competitive injury falls within the zone
of interests that the Emoluments Clauses sought to protect.”). On appeal, the Second Circuit initially
indicated that the zone of interests inquiry was unrelated to the standing question or subject matter
jurisdiction but went on to find that the competitors’ interests were within the Emoluments Clause’s zone of
interests, see Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 939 F.3d 131, 154–58 (2d Cir. 2019), but
the court subsequently amended its decision to delete its discussion of the merits of the zone of interests
question. See Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Washington v. Trump, 953 F.3d 178, 200 n.13 (2d Cir. 2020).
Presumably, absent a statutory cause of action, plaintiffs would have an equitable basis for relief. See Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 491 n.2 (2010) (noting that equitable relief is a
well-established mechanism for preventing entities from acting unconstitutionally); In re Trump, 958 F.3d
274, 286 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (noting likely availability of equitable relief in the Emoluments Clause
context).
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laid out in Raines v. Byrd358 by Goldwater v. Carter,359 is in tension with the Roberts
Court’s repudiation of a sidelined role for the federal judiciary in Zivotofsky I360
and, most recently, in Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP.361 To resolve this tension,
one can find room in Raines for a narrower reading, one that may legitimately
be asserted without overruling or engaging in unprincipled “confining.”362 It is
possible, consistent with Coleman, Raines, AIRC, and Virginia House of Delegates,
to permit limited standing by individual institutional actors whose institutional
prerogatives, such as votes or rights to appoint, are overridden by a coordinate
branch.
First though, a concession. One can absolutely read Raines to nearly
eviscerate institutional standing—if one is inclined—and lower courts and
commentators that have done so have not acted unreasonably.363 Chief Justice
Rehnquist was not messing around. The Court ultimately appeared to preserve
Coleman’s conclusion that individual legislators could assert institutional injury,
but it did so only after a lengthy paragraph poo-pooing the idea altogether.364
The Court disdainfully noted that the case pertained to “state legislators”365 and
did its best to put the case into a box.366 The Court drew much insight from the
fact that prior clashes among coordinate branches had not played out in federal
court.367 The Court’s purpose was plainly to harrumph at the idea of either
Congress or the President taking an institutional battle into a judicial forum.368
Anyone seeking to put legislative standing into a tiny box consisting of Powell v.
McCormack and mirror-image Coleman facts has ample fodder in Raines to do so;
anyone unwilling to cede even Coleman standing to congressional actors can—
as Judge Trevor McFadden369 and Justice Alito370 did—pick up on the fact that
conferring standing on state legislators raises no separation-of-powers
concerns. Raines can indeed be read broadly if that is one’s inclination.

358. 521 U.S. 811, 821–28 (1997).
359. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
360. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
361. 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020).
362. Daniel B. Rice & Jack Boeglin, Confining Cases to Their Facts, 105 VA. L. REV. 865, 873–74 (2019).
363. See Stern, supra note 183, at 31 (“Construing Raines as tacitly imposing a virtual blanket ban on
legislator standing finds support in both precedent and the tenor of the Court’s opinion.”).
364. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821–22 (1997).
365. Id. The Court emphasized that Coleman involved state legislators even as it disclaimed any need
to assess whether that provided a basis for distinguishing the case. See id. at 824 n.8.
366. See id. at 823.
367. See id. at 826–27. Again, this claim is curious because general federal question jurisdiction did not
exist until 1875. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
368. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 828.
369. See U.S. House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 21 n.8 (D.D.C. 2019) aff’d in
part, vacated in part, 976 F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
370. See Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1958 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting).
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But should it be? The Roberts Court appears to want these cases and
believes it has a role to play when two branches square off in a turf dispute.371
Because of Raines, the Court has felt constrained to rely on suits by individuals
whose claims to litigable interests are often dubious and whose incentivization
rests uneasily with the Court’s understanding of its own authority in other
areas.372 Raines commanded the majority vote that eluded Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Goldwater v. Carter; thus, the present Court cannot simply ignore
the case (as Zivotofsky I ignored Goldwater). However, there are ways to read
Raines that allow institutional actors limited, and systemically beneficial, forms
of standing. Setting aside the bluster, Raines addressed a particular kind of
claim—a comparatively easy claim for the denial of standing—from which
other kinds of institutional standing can, and should, be distinguished.
This Part proceeds in two sections. First, I make the case that the actual
holding of Raines is fairly modest. Then, having minimized Raines, I will develop
the “Coleman claim” concept further, making the case for the limited kinds of
institutional standing that ought to be permissible.
A. What Raines Did and Didn’t Do
It is important at the outset to decouple the holding of Raines from its
dicta.373 The Raines Court relied extensively on dogs that didn’t bark—the fact
that past presidents had not brought suit to enforce limitations on their removal
or appointment powers.374 A challenge to the President’s authority to file suit
in federal court was not before the Raines Court. At a minimum, though it clearly
expressed a mood, Raines says nothing binding or authoritative about executive
standing. The ability of the executive branch to resist incursions on its authority
by outside actors—hinted at in Federal Election Commission v. NRA Political Victory

371. See supra notes 277–280 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 277–280 and accompanying text.
373. The Court has repeatedly professed that it is not bound by dicta, those portions of its opinion
that are unnecessary to the result. See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 548 (2013) (“Is
the Court having once written dicta calling a tomato a vegetable bound to deny that it is a fruit forever
after?”); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006) (declaring itself free to set aside dicta in a
prior case in which the issue “was not fully debated”); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400
(1821) (“It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in
connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be
respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for
decision.”).
374. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 826–28 (1997); see also Nash, supra note 182, at 356 & n.109.
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Fund375—remains an open question that has not been foreclosed by any
Supreme Court decision.376
Focusing in, then, on congressional standing, it is important to differentiate
between two kinds of claims—claims where the claimant asserts that his own
chamber has inflicted institutional injury and claims where the claimant asserts
that a different branch of government has inflicted an institutional injury. In the
former situation, but not the latter, there are obvious mechanisms for self-help,
and standing, indeed a role for the judiciary at all, is more problematic.377 Raines
confronted precisely this situation: a challenge by members of Congress to a
statute on which they had just (unsuccessfully) voted.378 Such a claim could
never be conceptualized in Coleman terms because, by definition, the members’
votes had counted. There simply were too few of them, and the members had
in hand the ability to amend or repeal the statute upon convincing sufficient
numbers of their colleagues.379 Raines cited the self-help remedies the putative
litigants possessed in support of its holding.380 Again, Raines undeniably reflects
a shut-it-down mood, but the sole claim before the Court, and thus the sole
claim actually addressed, was an intrachambers dispute, a congressional “own
goal” that presented a straightforward case for denial of standing.381 Raines did
not confront claimed injury at the hands of another, overreaching branch.
375. 513 U.S. 88, 93 (1994) (“[I]t is undisputed that this is a case ‘in which the United States is
interested.’”(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 518(a))). The Court held that the Solicitor General, not the FEC, was the
appropriate entity under statute to petition for certiorari but did not reject the executive branch’s institutional
interest in pursuing the appeal. See id. at 96–97.
376. See Grove, supra note 27. Grove cites Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122 (1995), for the proposition that the Supreme Court has
suggested executive actors lack standing to protect institutional interests. See Grove, supra note 27. In Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs, a unanimous Court held, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that a Director
was not a person “adversely affected or aggrieved” within the meaning of the Longshore and Harbor
Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA). 514 U.S. at 130. The Court noted that other statutes had specifically
given executive actors the right to petition for review and found the absence of similar language in the
LHWCA dispositive. See id. The Court suggested that, in the absence of statutory authorization, an executive
actor seeking to prevent impairment of a governmental interest might have standing when it had “an interest
of an extraordinary nature, extraordinarily impaired.” Id. I see the case as a statutory case first and foremost
that actually leaves room for standing to pursue institutional harms (even without a statute) in extreme cases.
377. One could argue that legislation is always a self-help possibility, even when the harm comes from
an external branch. Relegating Congress to legislative remedies to avoid institutional injury at the hands of an
outside actor, though, ignores “the fact that ‘the legislative route is arduous and time-consuming’ and that
consequently the right asserted may prove to be unenforceable as a practical matter.” Note, Congressional Access
to the Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1648 (1977) (footnote omitted) (quoting Kennedy v. Sampson,
511 F.2d 430, 435 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) [hereinafter Note, Congressional Access]; see also Stern, supra note 183,
at 14 (“As a practical matter, the legislative tools theoretically available to counter executive inaction through
the political process are likely to prove unavailing.”).
378. See 521 U.S. at 814.
379. See Hall, supra note 156, at 13–14 (observing that Congress had inflicted the injury upon itself and
“plaintiffs’ quarrel was with their colleagues”).
380. See 521 U.S. at 823.
381. Arguably, it was a clearer case for employing the D.C. Circuit’s strategy of equitable abstention,
but I take Raines on its terms. Raines came two years after Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., in which a unanimous Court
had underscored “the breadth of leeway” embedded in the Declaratory Judgment Act’s “textual commitment
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Raines also did not say that Coleman claims could only be asserted by an
entire legislative body, and AIRC382 and Virginia House of Delegates383 didn’t
either. Although the penultimate paragraph in Raines attached “some
importance” to the fact that plaintiffs had not been authorized to represent
their respective houses, the Raines Court did not connect this absence of
authorization to the Coleman claim it had begrudgingly preserved six pages
earlier in another section of the opinion.384 Indeed, to do so, it would have had
to overrule that portion of Coleman permitting a subset of state senators to bring
suit, something the Raines Court’s approving reference to individual legislators
in Coleman plainly refuted.385 In AIRC, the Court found two bases to distinguish
Raines. First, the entire Arizona legislature, rather than individual members, had
brought suit, and second, the case presented a Coleman claim in that legislators,
stripped of their ability to vote on districting, could claim practical
nullification.386 The Court did not suggest that both of these factors were
necessary to confer standing.387 The Virginia House of Delegates case did not
involve a Coleman claim at all, a fact the Court emphasized.388 Thus, in
distinguishing the case from AIRC on the basis that only one chamber of the
Virginia legislature had sought to appeal, the Virginia House of Delegates case did
not suggest in any way that participation and authorization of both chambers is
a necessary feature of a Coleman claim.
Finally, although the Raines Court made a footnoted suggestion that it might
additionally be able to distinguish Coleman, which involved state legislators,
because it did not raise the same separation-of-powers concerns, the Court
to discretion” that permitted just such abstention, 515 U.S. 277, 286–87 (1995), but the Raines Court did not
consider that route.
382. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787 (2015).
383. Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945 (2019).
384. Raines, 521 U.S. at 829. The Court dropped a cryptic footnote citing a decision that a single
member of a school board lacked standing to appeal when the entire board had declined to do so, see Bender
v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544 (1985), and an 1892 decision in which the Court rejected
a Congressman’s challenge to internal House rules governing quorums. See United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S.
1, 7 (1892).
385. See 521 U.S. at 823; see also Hall, supra note 156, at 22 (“Coleman held that nullification of a specific
legislative vote could constitute an injury sufficient to confer standing on those individual legislators whose votes
were nullified.”). Hall finds in Raines the proposition that injuries to Congress’s institutional prerogatives can
be asserted by Congress itself but not by individual members, noting language that the Raines plaintiffs’
injuries were “wholly abstract and widely dispersed.” See id. (emphasis added) (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–
30). To me, Raines’ preservation of Coleman, a suit filed by individual members, suggests that the key point of
emphasis was on the “abstract” nature of plaintiffs’ claim of “dilution of institutional legislative power,” in
contrast to the comparatively concrete Coleman claim of vote nullification. Raines, 521 U.S. at 825–26.
386. 576 U.S. at 801–04.
387. Indeed, the AIRC Court expressly noted that only twenty of forty state senators had brought suit
in Coleman. See id. at 803. Hall has argued that, where the legislative prerogative belongs to an entire chamber,
as it did in AIRC, only that chamber in its entirety should have standing to assert it. See Hall, supra note 156,
at 28. I would submit that, where an entire chamber possesses a legislative prerogative, a majority of its
members would likewise have standing, as a numerical majority has the power to act on behalf of that
chamber. See infra notes 401–404 and accompanying text.
388. 139 S. Ct. at 1954.
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stopped short of deciding the question.389 AIRC likewise noted in a footnote
that the case dealt with a state legislature, rather than Congress, as an additional
point of distinction from Raines, but again it did not state that a Coleman claim
lacked applicability to members of Congress.390
In Raines, then, the Court confronted a simple claim by a handful of
individual members of Congress that the statute passed by their colleagues, on
which they had just unsuccessfully voted “nay,” was a flawed statute. Their suit
transparently sought another bite at a political process that had worked, albeit
one that had not ended as they wished.391 The injury they posited, that the lineitem veto granted to the President trammeled on their institutional
prerogatives,392 diluting their power, was one inflicted by Congress itself. Raines
begrudgingly left Coleman intact and did not circumscribe it to its state context,
did not directly connect its preservation of Coleman to official authorization by
the entire body, and did not say anything binding about standing of other
institutional actors. Put simply, Raines left quite a bit of room.
B. Chiseling Out the Coleman Claim: What Claims Institutional Actors Ought to Be
Able to Assert
Room, that is, for a properly-defined federal Coleman claim, which ought to
have several distinguishing and limiting features drawn from existing precedent
and a delimited Raines. The federal courts’ role should not be to pretermit the
political process, and this Article does not contend that federal courts should
be the place of first resort when coordinate branches overstep. Quite the
contrary, the federal courts’ role emerges out of necessity when dysfunction
overtakes the process and opportunities for self-help and political resolution
are not available, a principle reflected most recently in the Court’s unflinching
examination of a clash over the congressional subpoena power in Trump v.
Mazars.393 The first resort should always be the “tradition of negotiation and

389. See 521 U.S. at 824 n.8. As noted, Judge McFadden recently picked up on this distinction. See U.S.
House of Representatives v. Mnuchin, 379 F. Supp. 3d 8, 21 n.8 (D.D.C. 2019), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 976
F. 3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Moreover, Justice Alito, joined by three colleagues, dissented in Virginia House of
Delegates in part because “Raines rested heavily on federal separation-of-powers concerns, which are notably
absent here.” 139 S. Ct. at 1958 (Alito, J., dissenting).
390. 576 U.S. at 803 n.12.
391. This stratagem was reminiscent of that employed by Charles S. Fairchild, who having failed in his
political effort to derail the Nineteenth Amendment, sought unsuccessfully to secure the same result by
“indirection” in the federal courts. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 130 (1922).
392. Raines, 521 U.S. at 816.
393. The Court in Mazars committed itself “to ensure that we not needlessly disturb ‘the compromises
and working arrangements’” that—at least in the past—characterized interaction between Congress and the
Executive Branch. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2031 (2020) (quoting NLRB v. Noel
Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 524–26 (2014)).
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compromise;”394 the problem, though, is that the tradition these days is
increasingly honored in the breach.
The first thing a cognizable Coleman claim needs is a proper target. Unlike
in Raines, a Coleman claim must be asserted against a coordinate branch actor,
against which the plaintiff presumptively has fewer avenues for self-help, rather
than against the plaintiff’s own branch. The suit itself may reflect the plaintiff’s
calculus that the branches are at a political impasse. The federal courts, in such
circumstances, are not invited into an unseemly relitigation of a political battle
properly waged in another arena; rather, they are asked to draw lines and ensure
that each branch is respecting the separation-of-powers scheme anticipated by
the framers. In such circumstances, the federal court, as in Zivotofsky I, is called
upon for “careful examination of the textual, structural, and historical
evidence”—that is to say, called to do court-like things.395
Second, a Coleman claim must plausibly demonstrate that the defendant
actor has usurped an institutional prerogative that is constitutionally allocated
to the plaintiff’s office, overrunning boundaries and hindering the plaintiff’s
ability to perform as the Constitution anticipates. In Coleman, the tie-breaking
actions of the lieutenant governor stripped votes that had already been cast of
their effect.396 Despite Raines’ attempt to cabin Coleman to its precise factual
context, the Court in AIRC made clear that “nullification” is a more capacious
concept.397 In AIRC, the state legislature challenged the legislative districting
plan drawn by an independent redistricting commission, contending that the
plan and the commission deprived the state legislature of its role in drawing
legislative districts in violation of the Elections Clause.398 The state legislature
had neither voted on nor submitted its own plan.399 The Court found Coleman
sufficiently analogous because the scheme would nullify, “now or ‘in the
future,’” any role for the legislature in the redistricting process.400 It was enough,
in other words, that the legislature claimed its prescribed role in the process had
been foreclosed; the Court did not need to see or count up actual, already-cast
votes. Properly understood, the Coleman claim should encompass situations
where an institutional actor constitutionally should have some role and another
branch deprives it of the opportunity to play it.
Third, while it is not necessary to a Coleman claim that the whole legislative
body join the suit, the Court’s precedents support the requirement that there

394. Id.
395. Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012).
396. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
397. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 803 (2015).
398. Id. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter
such Regulations . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
399. See 576 U.S. at 801.
400. Id. at 804 (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823–24 (1997)).
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should be a sufficient number of plaintiffs that their participation in the process
(from which they were excluded) could have been outcome-determinative.
Sound legal and prudential reasons support this limitation, without which the
federal courts might become mired in lawsuits filed by individual actors whose
claims of injury are insufficiently concrete and for whom political remedies may
still exist.401 Importantly, requiring participation of an outcome-determinative
group limits the Court’s intercession to redressable conflicts. Again, the point
of permitting institutional standing should be that the political process has
broken down; one branch has precluded another from its participatory role and
left the other with paltry means of self-help. Requiring sufficient plaintiffs to
have changed the outcome comports with the instincts of the Raines, AIRC,
and Virginia House of Delegates Courts that the endorsement of the official body
matters at the margins.402 However, though participation of the whole body in
a lawsuit suffices to confer institutional standing, it is not necessary where an
outcome-determinative voting bloc has joined, as Coleman itself illustrates.
Coleman involved half of the state senate, all of whom had voted no, and their
votes, without the participation of the lieutenant governor, “would have been
sufficient to defeat ratification.”403 Their claim, in other words, was that the
outcome that would have obtained was distorted by the nullification. AIRC was
a suit filed by the whole legislative body, but nothing in the Court’s opinion
precludes the inference that a majority of voting members of each house could
likewise have brought the suit claiming their right to approve an alternative
districting scheme, and thus the result of the process, was likewise distorted.404
Examining the viability of a Coleman claim in the Emoluments Clause
context makes it more concrete. In Blumenthal v. Trump, 172 members of the
House and 30 members of the Senate claimed that the President’s receipt of
foreign emoluments without congressional consent violated the Constitution,
injuring them in their institutional capacities by depriving them of their right to
confer or withhold consent.405 They had a proper target: their quarrel was not
401. See Note, Congressional Access, supra note 377, at 1649 (arguing that permitting a single legislator to
go to the courts encourages bypass of the political process); Nash, supra note 182, at 343 (urging that legislative
standing be limited to situations where plaintiffs represent enough legislators to affect the outcome to avoid
“throw[ing] open the federal courthouse doors to legislators dissatisfied with particular political outcomes”).
Thus, a suit like that brought in Kennedy v. Sampson, in which a single senator challenged the President’s pocket
veto of a law claiming diminution of the effectiveness of his vote, would not stand. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974). In my view, the injury to the single senator, as opposed to a voting majority, is too conjectural, as the
same result could obtain even had the President acted properly. See Note, Congressional Access, supra note 377,
at 1638 (noting “the problem of stating with particularity the injury suffered by the plaintiff”).
402. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 829; Ariz. State Legislature, 576 U.S. at 801–02; Va. House of Delegates v.
Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct. 1945, 1953–54 (2019).
403. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438 (1939).
404. See 576 U.S. at 801–04. In Arizona, a bill passes by a simple majority in each chamber, after which
it goes to the governor. See Arizona Law: The Legislative Process, SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR COLLEGE OF
LAW: ROSS-BLAKLEY LAW LIBRARY, https://web.archive.org/web/20201111192608/https://libguides.la
w.asu.edu/ArizonaLaw/legislativeprocess (last visited July 7, 2020).
405. See Complaint at ¶¶ 4–6, Blumenthal v. Trump, 335 F. Supp. 3d 45 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 17-1154).
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with their own chamber; instead, they claimed that an outside actor, the
President, was doing something he was powerless to do unless they had
specifically authorized him to do it.406 Like the injury in AIRC, their claim
sounded in vote nullification; by failing to seek consent from Congress, the
President had afforded its members no opportunity to vote on consent at all.407
So far so good. However, while their target and their claim sounded in Coleman
terms, the Blumenthal plaintiffs were insufficiently numerous. A majority of
voters in both chambers would be required to approve an emolument via a joint
resolution;408 thus, a majority of voters in either chamber would have been
sufficient to withhold approval of an emolument. Had a majority of the House
signed onto the Complaint, standing would have been proper. However, with
less than a majority from either chamber in the caption, and thus a majority in
both chambers not participating in the lawsuit, the Blumenthal plaintiffs’ vote
nullification claim did not give rise to a tangibly disrupted outcome, thus
defeating their claim to standing.409
CONCLUSION
A rift amongst the Justices as to the appropriate role for the federal judiciary
in clashes between coordinate branches evaded repair in Goldwater v. Carter410
and found seeming resolution in Raines v. Byrd.411 In the Rehnquist era, the
Court invoked separation of powers to keep itself largely sidelined and was
content to leave Congress and the President to their political remedies. With
Zivotofsky I,412 the Roberts Court reasserted its role in patrolling the boundaries
of coordinate branches’ authority and checking them when they intrude upon
each other’s prerogatives. Reading the Constitution’s text, drawing inferences
from its structure, and considering historical context, the Court reasoned, is
“what courts do,” even when the questions are difficult and they trench on
sensitive areas, like authority to conduct foreign affairs.413 Trump v. Mazars
solidifies the Court’s perception of its role: it is willing to dive into and resolve
406. See Matthew Hall, Who Has Standing to Sue the President Over Allegedly Unconstitutional Emoluments?,
95 WASH. U. L. REV. 757, 770 (2017) (noting that in the Emoluments Clause context, inaction on the part of
either chamber means consent is denied). Hall contends that the right to vote on emoluments is an individual
prerogative and would permit standing to a single member, see id. at 771–72, a point with which this Article
disagrees.
407. See Complaint, supra note 405, ¶ 3.
408. A joint resolution approving receipt of an emolument appears to be the historical mechanism by
which Congress provided consent. See, e.g., H.R.J. Res. 39, 54th Cong. (1896) (providing that President
Benjamin Harrison “be, and he is hereby, authorized to accept certain medals presented to him by the
Governments of Brazil and Spain during the term of his service as President of the United States”).
409. Blumenthal v. Trump, 949 F.3d 14, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
410. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
411. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
412. 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
413. Id. at 201.
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a conflict between coordinate branches even when their impasse is historic and
the Constitution provides no clear answers.414
While the Roberts Court has asserted its confidence in providing answers
in the grey areas where coordinate branches intersect, it has relied primarily on
individual litigants to broach these claims. This occasionally works. For
example, where Congress has wrested an Article III decision maker from an
individual litigant in the case of a private right, the individual litigant has
suffered the unique harm of losing a decision maker who is insulated from the
political process. Outside the Article III context, though, it frequently does not
work. Individual litigants suffer no real injury when they are subject to coercive
action by someone appointed during an intrasession recess or by an actor other
than a head of department. Recognizing this, the Court has creatively imposed
bounties for successful litigants, allowing them an additional spin of the wheel,
one last chance to obtain a desired substantive outcome that is unrelated to the
separation-of-powers violation they have successfully pressed. The Court’s
liberties with doctrine in this area, and its use of a de facto private attorney
general mechanism improvised by judicial fiat, are difficult to square with what
the Court has done and said in other contexts. Moreover, reliance on individual
litigants is spotty. The branches can and frequently do clash and usurp each
other’s prerogatives in ways that touch no individual litigants at all.
This Article flags both the Roberts Court’s willingness to take on these
claims and the conceptual difficulty with its reliance on individual litigants and
urges that age-old limitations on institutional standing deserve another look.
Directly examining the issue before Raines, what it preserved, and what the
Court has done in related areas since, this Article finds room for limited
institutional standing where one branch circumvents the role of another branch,
leaving it without recourse and unable to perform its constitutionally allocated
role in the process, and the number of plaintiffs joined would be sufficient to
have changed the result. Admitting that Raines v. Byrd reflects a mood disdainful
of purported judicial intermeddling that can be read expansively, this Article
sets that mood aside as a relic of another Court, another era, and another
conception of the judicial function.

414. Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2029–32 (2020).

